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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the prospects and im-
pacts of tactical urbanism (TU). While tacti-
cal urbanism remains primarily a subcultural
movement, it is beginning to gain traction
in popular culture in traditionally politically
liberal cities, and in some cases, with their
respective city governments. However, little
data and formal research exists on TU.
I employ a comparative case study approach.
This thesis examines the urban legend sur-
rounding San Francisco's parklet program,
as many assume it a result of the TU in-
tervention, PARK(ing) Day. By looking at
the process of formalization of the parklet
program, the thesis seeks to uncover cre-
ative methods of policy reform, for example
through "innovation spotting" by local
government. I also examine three other TU
projects in Dallas, Texas; Brooklyn, New
York; and Raleigh, North Carolina.
I argue that tactical urbanism is a play on the
physical and political landscape, manifested
as a design intervention. While interventions
play on the two landscapes-not one-ur-
ban tacticians tend to focus primarily on
the physical play and miss the opportunities
presented by playing off the political and
institutional bodies as well. Tacticians that
relate their projects to interest groups and
government have a better chance to formal-
ize their intervention. Interventions capture
these efforts with varying levels of success
and sophistication, with each project differ-
ent in context and texture.
TU poses a host of risks and potential re-
wards. Like traditional acts of civil disobedi-
ence, TU can be very generative, allowing
players to pilot projects on a small-scale,
minimizing risk and cost. TU can go beyond
spotlighting problems to produce solutions.
Both are good, I argue, for government
and good for would-be innovators in civil
society.
Yet with rule breaking comes the risk of go-
ing beyond civil disobedience and duty into
parochial, special-interest agendas and even
vigilantism. To minimize that risk, the field
needs some rules of the road, as safeguards
in the TU playbook. As of now, TU does
not have a code. Developing one is a critical
next step, both for urban tacticians and plan-
ning research.
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INTRODUCTION
Otherwise known as Do-It-Yourself (DIY),
guerrilla, pop-up urbanism and city repair,
tactical urbanism (TU) gained a lot of hype
in certain circles in the past couple years. It
is a play on the physical and political land-
scape, manifested as a design intervention.
Though TU remains a subcultural move-
ment, urbanists, artists, residents, and even
some city governments are jumping on the
bandwagon. Typically found in tradition-
ally liberal cities, such as New York, San
Francisco, or Portland, look carefully and
you might notice a pop-up parklet, guer-
rilla bike lane or garden, or DIY wayfinding
signs materializing over night. Some acts,
such as PARK(ing) Day, stay within legal
confines, while others, such as Walk Raleigh
(North Carolina), and Better Block (Dallas,
Texas), do not. PARK(ing) Day, and some
components of Walk Raleigh, made the leap
into formalization. More commonly many
others-Better Block and Guerrilla Bike
Lane Separators on Bergen Street (Brooklyn,
New York)-are in a stage of recognition
and response from government. Given the
trend, it is likely many more projects exist
but never make it to this stage of recognition
and response.
Tactical urbanism is highly attractive be-
cause it yields a quick, tangible result. There
is some debate around TU as an effective
and fair vehicle for change. Some claim that
the popularity of tactical urbanism is really
a public critique expressing disillusionment
for dysfunctional city government. "The
problem is... the rise of tactical urbanism ac-
tually reflects the paralysis of city-wide and
systems-focused efforts... the enthusiasm
with which we've all embraced it is a tell for
what we don't talk about, which is funda-
mentally broken city governance" (Steffen,
2012). Others think long-term sustainability
is the biggest challenge for TU. "The key
challenge for tactical urbanism is sustain-
ability; i.e., whether citizens, developers,
and civic leaders can effectively collabo-
rate to make permanent change in a way
that's sensitive to, and informed by, a broad
cross-section of community desires" (Saitta,
2013). Interventions can demonstrate what
the community really wants by informally
piloting a project, but these acts are also the
physical manifestation of individualistic
expression. There is much debate surround-
ing tactical urbanism's claim to legitimacy
and its ability to institutionalize long-term
change in cities. As a burgeoning trend, TU
has yet to be thoroughly explored.
The bulk of this research examines the
urban legend surrounding San Francisco's
(SF) parklet program as many assume it a
result of PARK(ing) Day. By looking at the
process of formalization in this case, the
research hopes to uncover creative methods
of public policy reform. This research also
examines three other tactical urbanism proj-
ects ("caselets") in Dallas, Texas; Brooklyn,
New York; and Raleigh, North Carolina. I
use the primary and secondary case studies
to investigate these questions:
How and under what conditions has
tactical urbanism developed?
How has government responded to acts
of tactical urbanism? What are the effects
of tactical urbanism? Under what condi-
tions does government adopt or otherwise
institutionalize TU-originated practices or
policies? Under what conditions does TU
serve as a catalyst for longer-term and/or
scaled-up change?
The case studies flesh out a history of the
movement, the results of the TU project,
and interviews with key players from each
project.
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INVESTIGATING THE URBAN LEGEND OF SF'S
PARKLETS. FROM THIS?
Figure 1: Rebar's original PARK(ing) temporary intervention.
Photo credit: Scher & Rebar, 2005a.
TO THIS!
Figure 2: Parklet on 3876 Noriega Street, sponsored by Devil's Teeth Baking Company.
Photo credit: SF Planning Department, 2012.
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In conclusion, this thesis will provide policy
recommendations based on an analysis of
the above findings. Based on the results, the
conclusion will also give recommendations
about the long-term potential of TU as a tool
for change.
RESEARCH METHODS
While tactical urbanism encompasses a
variety of acts, this research focuses on
the recognition process of tactical urban-
ist interventions by city government. These
interventions specifically highlight issues of
mobility and public space in the neighbor-
hood.
THESIS METHODOLOGY
This thesis uses the case study method of
research to investigate how tactical urbanism
developed and how government responded.
The case study method is used to explore
TU because it is a relatively new trend and
not well understood in terms of development
and formalization. Little data and formal
academic research exists on tactical urban-
ism; and few instances have been thoroughly
studied or chronicled. Creating case studies
about this trend helps shed light on deci-
sions made by tacticians and government,
how they were implemented, and how/if
acts were formalized. Qualitative research
serves as an appropriate tool for investiga-
tion because of its descriptive qualities. The
methodology uses documentary evidence,
artifacts, and interviews key actors from dif-
ferent sectors to shed light on the decision-
making process.
CASE STUDIES
This section produced four case studies giv-
ing life and detail about the history of each
project, information about key actors, and
the institution(s) giving attention to these
acts including details about political engage-
ment, interaction and inspiration. Each tier
has a coordinating level of thoroughness.
PRIMARY CASE STUDY
San Francisco's Parklet Program, Pave-
ment to Parks (P2P), SF Planning
This case will incorporate the most thorough
approach of investigation. Two-stage sam-
pling and multiple methods saturate the case
to produce a deep analysis about the genesis
of San Francisco's parklet program.
METHODS
I incorporated a blend of qualitative methods
that would provide a more complete un-
derstanding given the myriad factors in the
case. In case study research it is valuable to
use data from a variety of sources to test and
cross-analyze the integrity of the narratives,
to glean critical perspectives from as many
sides as possible.
In January 2013, I went to San Francisco
to conduct a site visit to the first parklet by
Mojo's Cafd along Divisadero Street. There
I visited the parklet and walked the site to
get a feel for the neighborhood and how
the parklet related to the built environment
around it. The parklet juts out onto busy Di-
visadero, but provides enough of a set back
that the sidewalk and environment between
the parklet and Mojo's felt more peaceful.
The seating directly on the parklet felt calm
too. I took photographs to add to my per-
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sonal database. Unfortunately Mojo's Cafd
was under construction during my visit, so I
was not able to see the caf6 open and how it
functioned in relation with the parklet.
My primary data was key informant inter-
viewing with representatives from public
sector, urban tacticians, activists, the non-
profit sector, small business representatives,
and media. In San Francisco, I met most of
my interviewees and conducted face-to-face
interviews in their own office space. Inter-
viewing them in their professional environ-
ments helped inform my understanding
of the types of organizations and financial
backing of each player. The environment
tells a lot about both the informant and their
organization.
The purpose of the interviews are to gain
an insiders perspective about the history
and the origin of the parklet program, and
to gauge how influential the tactical urban-
ist intervention PARK(ing) Day was on the
city's parklet program. With the discussions
structured to illuminate connections between
tactical urbanism activism and the imple-
mentation of the project. How the public
sector learns of these types of projects,
when/why/how government decide a project
is worth implementing on their own, and
what kind of political support it requires to
lift something like this off the ground. The
questions I asked revolved around process,
implementation, and the relationship be-
tween PARK(ing) and the parklets.
The other qualitative methods I used in my
research included collecting documentation
of activities, such as renderings, reports,
and other programmatic information. I also
sourced media documentation and reports
(news print media, informal news sources,
blogs).
INFORMANT INTERVIEWS
The following people graciously served as
informant interviewees in this primary case
study. As representatives from the public
sector, the non-profit sector, small business
representatives, media, tactician and activist
point of view, their thoughts and perspec-
tives help inform this investigation. (Listed
in alphabetical order.)
Government
Paul Chasan, Current Manager, Pavement-
2Parks (P2P)
Timothy Papandreou, Deputy Director for
Strategic Planning, SFMTA
Andres Power, Former Manager, P2P
Ed Reiskin, Director, SF Metropolitan Tran-
sit Authority (SFMTA); former Director,
Public Works
Media
Aaron Naparstek, Founder and Former
Editor-in-Chief of Streetsblog
Non-profit
Gabriel Metcalf, Director, San Francisco
Planning and Urban Research Association
(SPUR)
Representative from the San Francisco
Bicycle Coalition
Private sector
Remy Nelson, Owner, Mojo Caf6; first par-
klet sponsor
8
Urban tacticians
Blaine Merker, PARK(ing) Day Creator;
Principle, Rebar
Matthew Passmore, PARK(ing) Day Cre-
ator; Principle, Rebar
SECONDARY CASE STUDIES
Better Block, Dallas, Texas
Walk Raleigh, North Carolina
Guerrilla Bike Lane Separators on
Bergen Street, Brooklyn, New York
Each case represents a different stage of
identification and recognition by their re-
spective city governments, which could help
illustrate the different phases of recognition.
The purpose of analyzing the inner- and
outer-workings of these tactical implemen-
tations will help illuminate the process of
formalization and/or institutionalization.
The scope of these cases is significantly nar-
rower, but they still use a multiple methods
approach to illustrate the types of activities
taking place in various cities. Sketching out
these activities also gives perspective on
tactical urbanism and demonstrates Rebar's
PARK(ing) Day is not an anomaly.
The research uses documentation of activi-
ties such as renderings, reports, and pro-
grammatic information. Media documenta-
tion and reports (news print media, informal
news sources, blogs) were also used to
inform this narrower investigation. I col-
lected some primary data on the Guerrilla
Bike Lane. For this case, I asked a friend to
take photographs of the bicycle lane on April
26, 2013 to confirm if the barriers were still
present.
KEY FINDINGS
. Tactical urbanism is a play on the physi-
cal and political landscape, manifested
as a design intervention. Each inter-
vention was not a means to an end. In
some successful cases the intervention
becomes a stepping-stone to create a
longer-term solution.
. The long-term success of tactical urban-
ism appears to depend on the tactician's
ability to engage the interest of the
public and the more powerful interest
groups in the area.
. By removing the risk factor from
government, tactical urbanism works
synergistically with the public sector to
innovate by public pilot testing.
. Tactical urbanism blurs the lines of
participatory planning and civic en-
gagement. It is highly individualistic,
but also allows some space for public
participation. It has elements of com-
munitarianism but is not necessarily
democratic. It engages some civil dis-
obedience tactics, but does not encour-
age or engage participatory techniques
to articulate a message or cause. It has
the spirit of "self-help" practices, but
risks becoming an elitist movement by
representing the very few.
. Tactical urbanism is not defined by
expanded participation in official
decision-making or deliberative practice
but rather by small-scale direct action-
shaping outcomes immediately, tangibly,
on the ground.
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ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTERS
Introduction: This section sketches the
context for the research. It defines tactical
urbanism and lays the investigative research
foundation for the thesis.
Chapter One: It introduces tactical urban-
ism along with some fundamental ques-
tions about the integrity of the act in terms
of public participation and innovation as it
relates to city making. This chapter weighs
the limitations and contributions of previous
research as they relate to tactical urbanism.
Chapter Two: By exploring the three
"caselets," this chapters helps determine TU
characteristics and provide greater context
and texture about the trend.
Chapter Three: This is the heart of the
thesis and explores the urban legend around-
San Francisco's parklets (the primary case
study). It uses the primary data and analysis
collected to examine the process that took
PARK(ing) to parklets. By investigating the
process of recognition and formalization of
the parklet program, this chapter hopes to
shed light on creative practices to reform
public policy.
Chapter Four: Key findings, recommenda-
tions, summary analysis, and future areas of
research inquiry are outlined in this chapter.
It also investigates tactical urbanism in two
parts: 1) as a long-term sustainable tool for
change; 2) the specific impact and influ-
ence it had in the San Francisco case and the
"caselets."
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1. WHAT IS TACTICAL URBANISM?
In the past several years, small "pop-up"
changes in the urban fabric have started
appearing in cities throughout the United
States. In 2011 the term "tactical urban-
ism" was coined (Lydon, 2010, 2011), and
a new trend defined. Other common terms
to describe acts of tactical urbanism are Do-
It-Yourself/guerrilla/pop-up urbanism and
"city repair" (Lydon, 2010, 2011). Tactical
urbanism (TU) refers to temporary activities
that are both sanctioned and unsanctioned by
local government. These projects highlight
a need or want in a community, and some of
these projects are formalized.
While tactical urbanism remains primarily
a subcultural movement, it is beginning to
gain traction in popular culture in tradition-
ally politically liberal cities and in some
cases with their respective city governments.
Identifying the beginnings of a pattern, Ly-
don and his cohorts-"the tacticians"-pub-
lished two volumes on tactical urbanism and
its uses. In both volumes they define tactical
urbanism character:
. A deliberate, phased approach to insti-
gating change;
. An offering of local ideas for local plan-
ning challenges;
. Short-term commitment and realistic
expectations;
. Low-risks, with a possibly a high re-
ward; and
. The development of social capital
between citizens, and the building of
organizational capacity between public/
private institutions, non-profit/NGOs,
and their constituents (Lydon, 2010,
2011).
Lydon's definition includes activities from
guerrilla gardening and wayfinding sig-
nage, to DIY complete street networks and
bike lanes, to micro-entrepreneurs sharing
building space, and street vendors and food
trucks. This definition of tactical urbanism
encompasses an enormous variety of activi-
ties that fall under the TU umbrella. Tactical
Urbanism Volume 1 and olume 2 lump all
of these ad hoc activities together.
Though an important definition, this thesis
argues the other component of tactical ur-
banism is also about the intangible political
dynamics within each intervention. This re-
search pushes a new, more specific definition
forward: tactical urbanism is a play on the
physical and political landscape, manifested
as a design intervention.
In addition to the projects and sources that
Lydon identifies, there is also the trend of
crowdfunding to sponsor tactical urbanism
projects. Crowdfunding sites such as Kick-
starter allow independent urban tacticians to
solicit funding for their projects.' In some
aspects, independently funding local projects
democratizes project implementation. Today
communities have options beyond traditional
funding streams, such as public and private
grants. Instead groups can create a Kick-
starter campaign, get it funded, and use the
monies to implement the project.
However, this mechanism opens up neigh-
borhoods to outside funding which sponsor
hyper-local niche interventions that may
or may not benefit those who live there. In
all likelihood Kickstarter campaigns for
micro-projects are typically funded by the
social networks of the campaign creator, but
legitimate is a project that receives most of
its funding from non-local contributors?
In fact, these are new iterations of the same
questions of legitimacy and process that city
government and communities have struggled
with for decades: Who decides what and
I As of November 24, 2012 1 found twelve tactical urbanism projects that received 100%+ fumding to install their projects on
Kickstarter.
where projects get implemented? How much
input do the people who live with the project
have versus the public (or private) body that
pays for and implements the project?
TACTICAL URBANISM, CIVIC
ENGAGEMENT, + 'INNOVATION
SPOTTING' IN CITY-MAKING
There is little doubt of the importance of
public participation today. It can be a messy
process but participation is a critical compo-
nent of a democracy supporting legitimacy,
justice, and efficacy of public action (Fung,
2006). City government and communities
have struggled to find the balance on these
issues for decades.
One of the most famous examples that led
to this struggle was the decade-long fight
(1959-71) over the Lower Manhattan Ex-
press Way in New York City (Flint, 2009).
Post-WWII, federally funded urban renewal
programs implemented by top-down plan-
ning was the norm. In response, Jane Jacobs
led a community-organized movement that
ultimately prevented the construction of the
urban freeway (Jacobs, 1961). The struggle
over the proposed Lower Manhattan Express
Way became an infamous example of this
deeply flawed system (Flint, 2009). This
movement exemplified community organiz-
ing in planning and planted the seeds for a
bottom-up planning process. It opened the
dialogue around public participation and
legitimacy in planning.
Over time the transformation in public sector
development policy from residents as objects
of policy implementation, to residents as
engaged and active participants, has only in-
creased (Rohe & Gates, 1985). This change
is reflected in the language of the field:
"bottom-up planning," "grassroots activ-
ism," "participatory planning," "community-
based planning" remain popular buzzwords
today in the sector. Research also supports
this shift: projects are less likely to fail with
community buy-in. A process that provides
sufficient space for dialogue has other
positive effects including personal network
development which helps build social net-
works, and can even strengthen institutional
capacity (Innes & Booher, 2004). These
networks are a critical component as it helps
to build legitimacy for the implementation.
Over the past decade, the field of participa-
tory decision-making witnessed exponential
growth (Leighninger, 2012; Nabatchi, 2012).
This recent proliferation of interest in civic
engagement is driven by a larger frustration
that the formal procedures of our democracy
are struggling to respond to public demand.
"This growth is driven... by the new politi-
cal conditions facing leaders and managers,
and by shifts in the expectations and capaci-
ties of ordinary people. In many situations,
the old ways of dealing with public prob-
lems no longer work" (Leighninger, 2012).
The problems facing government institu-
tions jurisdictions-environment, economic
growth, health, social equity-cut across a
variety of professional sectors and political
and administrative jurisdictions. "Neces-
sarily, the 'wicked' character of such public
problems recognizes the world in its social
complexity, where public decision-making
involves so much more than dealing with
technicalities" (Christiansen & Bunt, 2012).
With the complexity of overlapping systems,
decision-making requires more flexibility
and input. The proliferation in the field
demonstrates that our old methods need a
systems upgrade.
The effort to create a more democratic
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process resulted in a legal mechanism that
causes distrust, disenfranchisement, and con-
flict rather than cohesion (Innes & Booher,
2004). Public hearings, written public com-
ments on proposed projects, citizen-based
commissions such as planning and zoning
commissions and boards, advisory commit-
tees, and task forces, do not work. "Most
often these methods discourage busy and
thoughtful individuals from wasting their
time going through what appear to be noth-
ing more than rituals designed to satisfy
legal requirements" (Innes & Booher, 2004).
Thus the negative effects can reflect a public
process that is more ritual and tradition, than
constructive practice (Briggs, 2003). Our
current method tends to divide topics into
blocks which pits interests against each oth-
er-public versus private, individual versus
collective-rather than seeking to identify
commonalities to build upon. Once more,
"The hearing and public comment processes
tend to be formalistic, one-way communi-
cation from members of the public to the
agency or elected officials... The citizen role
is to react" (Innes & Booher, 2004).
These grievances speak to the effort to create
a fairer democratic system, that the pendu-
lum swung too far in the opposite direction
by giving too much weight to groups that do
not represent majority interests-NIMBY2
-ism and Neighborhood Boards are often
cited as examples (Campanella, 2011). "The
public, as many polls have shown, typically
believes that government is unresponsive
to their concerns or, even more to the point,
is responsive to special interests that fund
increasingly expensive campaigns" (Innes
& Booher, 2004). But tactical urbanism flips
this paradigm on its head. Suddenly it is the
government and the public's role to react to
a citizen-initiated intervention.
Tactical urbanism provides an outlet to the
current debate around methods of public par-
ticipation. Much of the attraction to tactical
urbanism is the immediate gratification of
physical change-something implemented,
temporary or not. Quality, fairness, legitima-
cy, and impact are all qualities that might be
determined by longevity of the intervention.
In short, longevity may imply support. If the
project stays, that means the public accepts
and it is therefore legitimate; if it goes, it is
neither accepted nor legitimate. Whether by
public debate or longevity of a piloted TU
project, a well-intentioned process is not
enough. It must be grounded in a concrete
and effective strategy that addresses the
larger organizational and project questions
(Briggs, 2003). Intention is ineffective if not
rooted in a structured system or approach.
One systemized process is through delibera-
tive civic decision-making (Fung, 2006).
This process centers around learning, edu-
cating and exploring joint interests-"What
do we have in common?"-rather than
bargaining over issues. "Two features distin-
guish the deliberative mode. First, a process
of interaction, exchange, and... edification
precedes any group choice. Second, partici-
pants in deliberation aim toward agreement
with one another... based on reasons, argu-
ments, and principles" (Fung, 2006).
Consensus building is another process that
has its roots in deliberative civic decision-
making. "In political theory, [deliberative
civic decision-making] has been elaborated
and defended as a deliberative ideal of de-
mocracy, while scholars of dispute resolution
have described such processes as negotia-
tion and consensus building" (Fung, 2006).
Consensus building can be used to manage
the often unequal listening and grievance
process in the conventional public system.
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Proponents advocate that this method creates
the best, fair, stable outcomes, without which
projects often result in unfair or unequal
outcomes (Susskind, 2006, 2008).
Here is where we begin to see the serious
limitations of TU. Tactical urbanism al-
lows no space for group deliberation of any
kind. The majority of TU interventions do
not have the capacity, nor are designed for a
multi-directional interaction beyond asking
the public to "react." In this case, the closest
thing to deliberation may be a reaction to the
intervention by blog post, Facebook post,
or other low-barrier "public" and/or social
media source.
As a response to some the shortcomings to
these processes, artistic community-oriented
approaches are emerging. The creative spirit
of tactical urbanism intersects with these
artistic methods. James Rojas facilitates
citizen-built models of their city/neighbor-
hood/block using anonymous, random
objects to demonstrate and "mine" local
knowledge (Rojas, 2010). Candy Chang's
work is at the nexus of tactical urbanism and
installation art. She uses the city as a can-
vas, and develops work that prompts citi-
zen participation. One of her most famous
pieces encouraged residents to complete the
sentence in chalk, "Before I die," stenciled
on the exterior of a dilapidated, abandoned
house in her neighborhood in New Orleans
(Chang, 2011). Other creative approaches
include Public Question Campaigns led by
non-profit groups, such as North End Orga-
nizing Network (NEON) and Engage The
Power (eTp) (McDowell & Otero, 2011).
Public Question campaigns seek to allow
anyone and everyone to ask questions that
can help shape the public process, as op-
posed to citizens reacting to preset agendas
(McDowell & Otero, 2011). All of these
approaches build on the self-help notion that
communities know their neighborhood best,
and planners must find effective methods to
tap into that local knowledge. TU takes this
ethos to the extreme when the individual
speaks for the community.
These community-oriented activities feed
into a growing trend in government inno-
vation in the United States. "What began
as a focus on using technology to increase
transparency (so-called Open Government)
has shifted to focus on citizen participation,
participatory democracy, service delivery,
leadership practices, and organizational
change" (Bason, 2013). Open-source tech-
nology uses data made available by govern-
ment to develop free applications to fill a
public need. While these larger democratic
issues (citizen participation, participatory
democracy, and more) pre-date the Open
Government movement, innovators are
exploring how technology and public sector
data can be applied to these areas. Examples
of Open Government projects include open
source technology driven applications (Me-
tra Schedules, 2nd City Zoning), Code for
America (non-profit), the Open Innovator's
Toolkit (the White House). In this case, the
government does not innovate, but facilitates
innovation by providing access to the data.
"President Obama emphasizes a 'bottom-
up' philosophy that taps citizen expertise to
make government smarter and more respon-
sive to private sector demands" (The White
House, n.d.).
Taken from MindLab and Nesta, Figure 3
illustrates the transition to co-production
happening more often in the public sector
(Christiansen & Bunt, 2012). On the left is
the conventional approach, with the citizen
impacted by the state, not influencing the
state. On the right, the Venn diagram sym-
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bolizes the co-production approach in its
ideal state with all sectors overlapping and
giving equal weight and space creating a
completely co-produced result (middle sec-
tion).
TU creates an emerging relationship be-
tween tacticians, the public, interest groups,
and government. The influence of interest
groups as applied to local government is
a foundational power dynamic in politics.
Interest groups are often characterized as
sources of competition in the back-and-
forth power play between citizen and state.
gain the attention of decision-makers, which
can provide a leg-up in the negotiation
process. Though there is little space for de-
liberation in TU, some projects (e.g. Better
Block, Dallas) included a small amount of
opportunity for selective public input.
The emerging relationship between urban
tacticians and government riffs off the Open
Government trend. TU might be seen as a
mechanism to publicly source innovation:
an individual puts forth an intervention, and
the crowd reacts to it. The crowd does not
develop it. It is not co-produced.
Figure 3: Traditional power dynamics compared to emerging varieties of co-production
(Christiansen & Bunt, 2012).
The relationship between these key groups,
which in their most ideal balance, can pro-
vide enough tension and back-and-forth to
"transcend transactional politics" (Briggs,
2013).
While there is little space for deliberation in
tactical urbanism, TU does share character-
istics of "contest" within democracy. "In the
contest view, civic action is a strategic, inter-
est-driven process in which public decisions
are riddled with competing objectives and
the proverbial pie must be divided" (Briggs,
2008). If successful, a TU intervention helps
Tactical urbanism works symbiotically with
government because it takes the risk out
of the government's hands. Government is
notoriously risk-adverse while many in the
private sector approach risk as a necessary
step to develop new ideas, innovate, and
reap the awards. "... If something fails in
government, political leaders and staff know
they are likely to be questioned about wast-
ing funds. Often the real incentive in govern-
ment is to keep doing things in the proven
and safe way-even if that means better,
more efficient methods are never identified"
(Kohli, 2011). The public sector is subject
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to many different pressures than the private
sector. In TU, the risk lays solely on the
individual and if it is a "success"-mean-
ing people like it and the intervention stays
put-that creates a much lower barrier to
entry for the public sector.
But tactical urbanism takes this one step
further with residents bringing self-selected
local problems to the forefront of public dia-
logue by implementing a project that high-
lights their chosen issue. Much of the energy
of TU, and this "self-help" activism, comes
from the frustration with our planning pro-
cess in the United States. For these reasons,
TU also shares traits of disruptive innova-
tion. "A disruptive innovation is an innova-
tion that helps create a new market and value
network, and eventually goes on to disrupt
an existing market and value network... dis-
placing an earlier technology" (Wikipedia,
2013). It is not replacing the formalized pub-
lic process, nor forcing it into obsolescence,
but if the trend continues to grow, it has the
power to change the dynamics of the pro-
cess. Bypassing the system, using subversive
measures like TU, is emerging as a new way
to get things implemented.
There is a lot of gray area when working out
the social construction process between state
and society. States do not intentionally sanc-
tion illegal activity, but there is some overlap
by which each player permits a certain
degree of "symbiosis" (Smart & Heyman,
1999). "State law inevitably creates its coun-
terparts, zones of ambiguity and outright il-
legality" (Smart & Heyman, 1999). Director
of San Francisco's Metropolitan Transporta-
tion Authority (SFMTA) expressed a level of
discretion in consequence for certain proj-
ects as government is likely be more permis-
sive or forgiving if there is no public health
or safety issue involved, especially if it is
a short-term project (Reiskin, 2013). When
these levers of engagement and power do not
work, part of the social contract is calling
attention to the pitfalls through public dis-
course, which can involve protest and civil
disobedience-which might be expressed by
TU intervention.
There are many different forms of protest
and ways to engage. Strategic law breaking
can be used to promote freedom-an expres-
sion of rationality and justice (Scott, 2012).
Looking back to the most famous social
movements that used civil disobedience
as a means of discourse-the Civil Rights
movement, the Vietnam War protests, to the
Occupy Movement-unlike tactical urban-
ism interventions, they employed significant
community organizing at the neighborhood
level, district level, city level and the na-
tional scale. These large, famous movements
worked with the greater public and used civil
disobedience to create a more open system.
TU interventions push for change vocalized
by an individual, which is by nature a more
narrow, specialized push for change. It may
or may not help the greater community.
TU differs from what we have convention-
ally thought of as social movements: collec-
tive action, on a broad, mobilized base, to
pressure government for change and in the
process change public attitudes and norms.
Unlike the more "classic" social movements,
TU varies greatly in scale, character, and
values. Larger scale movements, like Oc-
cupy, relied on messaging that spoke directly
to the values and beliefs of supporters. This
messaging was created in an engaged back-
and-forth on Twitter and across other social
media networks (Orcutt, 2011). But tactical
urbanism only expresses the beliefs of the
implementers, which may or may not reflect
the beliefs of the community around them.
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In TU the demo creates the public discourse,
versus Occupy and other social movements
rely on community organizing and public
protest to create public discourse. Both
strains-classic protest and TU-use the
public sphere as a building point to engage
new supporters and re-energize a wave of
momentum to ride.
This action might be an immediate response
to a need they see within their own com-
munity. The individual gets the job done
themselves. Banding together to collectively
problem solve has other benefits than simply
getting the job done-civic engagement,
building social capital, improved personal
health and wellbeing (Putnam, 2000). Ac-
cording to Putnam social capital, shorthand
for civic engagement (from formal acts like
petitions, to informal activities such as fam-
ily dinners or drinks with friends), is on the
decline which impacts our social fabric for
the worst (Putnam, 2000). Social capital is
shorthand for civic engagement, acts builds
community, networks, and can collectively
formulate action for the betterment of soci-
ety (Putnam, 2000).
Indeed, in the first stage of implementa-
tion, tactical urbanists seem to be "bowling
alone" (Putnam, 2000). Rather than band-
ing together to collectively problem solve,
the individual is going at it alone. TU might
be another example of a component of the
larger decline of civic engagement. How-
ever, while implementing the initial stages of
an intervention can be a solitary or indi-
vidualistic act, getting it formalized, or even
recognized by the public and government is
by nature a collaborative process. A tactician
must work with media, the public, and pos-
sibly government representatives or elected
officials to initiate the recognition process.
A community that "takes things into their
own hands" by acting on their own is not
necessarily protesting and/or pushing the
state towards a particular outcome. Although
tactical urbanism uses borderline devious
techniques in the name of civic activism, TU
risks veering into the territory of vigilantism.
TU effectively straddles both spheres. It can
be a powerful form of civil disobedience
by civic improvement through community
"self-help" activism, or an elitist movement
for the individual.
Urban tacticians produce the physical
change they want to see, thereby pressuring
government to formalize or produce these
changes. But how much of tactical urban-
ism borrows from self-help and community
initiated action? Acts that cross the line into
vigilantism are those that seek to exclude
members in a given area or elevate certain
small interest groups. Does this friction actu-
ally strengthen society or erode it by devel-
oping deeper social factions siloed in their
own interests?
As we recalibrate what our values are as a
society, our institutions become shaped by,
and should reflect the values of society at
large. At the local scale, even government
representatives-a body dedicated to reflect-
ing the values of the community they repre-
sent-are often out of touch with key aspects
of community life that remain out of reach
in the public sector. Recalibration requires a
two-way dialogue stream in order for society
to shape institutions and vice versa. This
back-and-forth is critical to the social con-
struction process between state and society
(de Soto, 2000; Demsetz, 1967). If we look
at TU through this lens, the more deviant,
unsanctioned activities appear to fit in with
society's social contract with the state.
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Tactical urbanism blurs the lines of partici-
patory planning and civic engagement. It is
highly individualistic, but also allows some
space for public participation. It has ele-
ments of communitarianism but is not neces-
sarily democratic. It engages some civil dis-
obedience tactics, but does not encourage or
engage participatory techniques to articulate
a message or cause. It has the spirit of "self-
help" practices, but risks becoming an elitist
movement by representing the few. When
government allows TU, it enables elite
crowdsourcing-an individual puts forth an
innovation, but the crowd reacts to it. By
removing the risk factor from government,
tactical urbanism works synergistically with
the public sector to innovate by public pilot
testing. Tactical urbanism is not defined by
expanded participation in official decision-
making or deliberative practice but rather by
small-scale direct action-shaping outcomes
immediately, tangibly, on the ground.
But the real test comes once the project is
implemented. Much of the power behind TU
lies in its ingenuity to creatively and quickly
call attention to a concern. The longevity and
change-power lay in the tactician's ability to
use the project to call more public attention
to the issue. Planning decisions are usually
not about the quick adoption of smart ideas,
no matter their origins. As we will see in
the next chapters, TU's long-term, sustained
impact on policy and practice depends on
the innovator and the government learning
to navigate multi-stakeholder, institutional-
ized processes of democratic deliberation,
decision-making, and implementation.
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2. TACTICAL URBANISM "CASELETS"
Tactical urbanism (TU) interventions are
happening across the country. By surveying
a few TU interventions taking place across
the nation, this chapter hopes to provide
some perspective on the field of TU. These
case studies focus on unsanctioned interven-
tions that highlight issues of mobility and
public space. I use the following cases as
exemplars:
Better Block, Dallas, Texas
Walk Raleigh, North Carolina
Guerrilla Bike Lane Separators
on Bergen Street, Prospect Heights
Brooklyn, New York
This chapter hopes to highlight and define
some of the conditions in which they gain
recognition and start the institutionalization
process. Rather then government absorb-
ing the project into the public realm, many
activities matured in ways that led to new
projects and outcomes. Because these inter-
ventions continue to evolve, these sketches
should be considered as "snapshots in time."
Much of the information on the caselets
focuses on the activists' account of the
project. These accounts create a "political
conversation" as carried out through unsanc-
tioned acts, media exchanges, and the formal
political process. Awareness of the project is
disseminated through a symbiotic relation-
ship between the media and the public. The
media primarily relies on word-of-mouth ac-
counts, and the informal observation of use
patterns; activists rely on the longevity of
their project and media accounts of project
offspring in other cities.
Tactical urbanism plays on the physical
and political landscape of each city. As we
will see in this chapter, the most successful
projects use a variety of strategies that feed
off the political zeitgeist in their cities. Some
projects ride the momentum already taking
place, while others foment movement in
their city.
BETTER BLOCK,
OAK CLIFF, DALLAS, TEXAS
WHAT: Informal, unsanctioned, activity
to redesign block into one with a Complete
Streets typology
WHO: Jason Roberts
WHEN: April 2010 - present
NOW: Established non-profit organization
and proliferation of Better Block events
IMPACT: Helped implement 28 other Bet-
ter Block events nation-wide; permanent
impact unknown
The Better Block (BB) non-profit uses
tactical urbanism techniques to physically
demonstrate the possibilities of a walkable,
bikable, commercial block. The BB uses the
Complete Streets 3 typology-a street design
system that dedicates equal priority to all
users (National Complete Streets Coalition,
2010). Today the organization is dedicated
to supporting interested citizens put on their
own Better Block event. As of April 2013,
BB helped implement 28 other Better Block
events (Open Source, 2012).
BB got its start in April 2010. Over a two
day period, a group of 15 citizens-archi-
tects, business owners, non-profit leaders,
activists, artists, and residents-transformed
the 400 Block of North Tyler Street from an
auto-centric thoroughfare into one that more
closely modeled a complete street (Better
Block Admin, n.d.; Moto, 2010). It was pro-
moted as a 2-day "art crawl" that was "part
.0
.0
.0
3 Smart Growth America's National Coalition for Complete Streets dedicate equal priority to all users-autos and NMT modes.
"[Complete Streets] are designed and operated to enable safe access for all users. Pedestrians, bicyclists, motorists, and public 1 9
transportation users of all ages and abilities are able to safely move along and across a complete street... By adopting a Com-
Figure 4: Better Block guerrilla bike lane
Photo credit: Roberts, 2010a.
art installation, part political statement"
(Better Block Oak Cliff Art Crawl 2 Promo-
tional Poster, 2010). Go Oak Cliff spear-
headed this first tactical urbanist intervention
with Jason Roberts (Board Secretary of Go
Oak Cliff, and founder of Bike Friendly Oak
Cliff), Andrew Howard, and Amy Wallace
Cowan (Board Member, Go Oak Cliff)
leading the effort. The non-profit organiza-
tions involved were Go Oak Cliff and Bike
Friendly Oak Cliff. Shag Carpet, a set design
group, helped set up some of the exterior
landscaping such as lighting and cafe seating
(Roberts, 2010). Cliff Notes bookstore, and
pop-up shops such as a gift shop, Wigwam
flower shop, a cafe, and a children's art store
were also part of the intervention.
The 400 Block of Tyler Street in Oak Cliff
borders industrial and residential area (see
photo below). The original neighborhood
framework was built to a human scale. With
a streetcar proving service to downtown,
Oak Cliff gained popularity in the early
1900s (Ross, 2012). In 1956 the streetcar
disappeared, with the post-World War II
"White flight" to the suburbs (Ross, 2012;
Wilonsky, 2010).
Dallas centered its development around the
automobile, and the zoning changed to light
industrial on one side, and residential on
the other (Wilonsky, 2010). This bifurcated
zoning policy created a mismatch in use and
changed the residential neighborhood to a
high-speed corridor. "Two things occurred
that were bad for the area... Zoning changed
to light industrial on one side and residen-
tial on the other, which means you can't do
live-work developments... [After the street-
car] Tyler and Polk became one-way streets,
so you lost 50 percent of the visibility and
made it an unsafe high-speed corridor"
(Wilonsky, 2010).
But Oak Cliff has benefited from the nation's
renewed interest in cities, experiencing
something of a revival. In 2000 the city in-
vested $2.5 million into pedestrian-oriented
infrastructure improvements (sidewalks,
drainage, and lighting) in the nearby area
of Bishop Arts (Ross, 2012). Today Bishop
Arts is home to a tvo-block commercial area
comprised of 60 independent small busi-
nesses that attract shoppers and diners to a
"pedestrian-friendly experience unavailable
elsewhere in Dallas" (Ross, 2012).
Today it is an underused neighborhood
corridor, with vacant properties, widened
streets, and little amenities for residents that
lived in the area. The idea for this first Better
Block came about in 2009 during the Tyler
Street Block Party. Roberts explains: "We
had so many people hanging out-around
200-and bands and bike races and an out-
door screening of Pee-Wee's Big Adventure,
but the cops showed up and said, 'You need
to get these people out of street. The streets
are for cars, not for people,' which distills
exactly what we've been trying to say. The
whole thing felt safe. There were people
everywhere. The streets were teeming with
life, people were buying food-all kinds of
stuff. It highlighted the opportunity to take
plete Streets policy, communities direct their transportation planners and engineers to routinely design and operate the entire
20 right-of-way to enable safe access for all users, regardless of age, ability, or mode of transportation" (National Complete Streets
Coalition, 2010).
Figure 5: An Oak Cliff Better Block demonstration with borrowed trees and greenery on West
Davis Street. Photo credit: Go Oak Cliff, n.d.
that and turn this onto a truly livable block"
(Wilonsky, 2010).
Activists in the area thought changing the
design might produce an outcome that would
be more functional for their needs. Rob-
erts "received a nod" from his city council
member, and Cowan secured a permit to
close part of the street (Ross, 2012). The
unsanctioned activity came in the form of re-
modeling the street. Without permitting, the
group temporarily remodeled the block into
one with extended sidewalks, a bicycle lane,
wall mural, cafd seating, trees, plants, pop-
up businesses, and lighting (Better Block
Admin, n.d.). Materials for the project were
collected from donors in the area.
The effort physically modeled changes that a
reworked zoning policy could achieve. "The
project was developed to show the city how
the block could be revived and improve area
safety, health, and economics if ordinances
that restricted small business and multi-
modal infrastructure were removed" (Bet-
ter Block Admin, n.d.). The demonstration
publicly questioned zoning restrictions that
prohibited the creation of a retail presence.
"Part of the problem in this city are zoning
restrictions placed on people who want too
create, say, outdoor cafe seating or put up
awnings... It's set to light industrial only,
and there are restrictions on parking-you
can't open a business without so many park-
ing spaces" (Wilonsky, 2010). The BB "art
crawl"' demonstrated how a block might
transform if government changed the restric-
tions to more align with the current commu-
nity who lives there.
While the BB project received media at-
tention-outlets The Dallas Observer Blog
Unfair Park, Oak Cliff Blog on the Dal-
las News.com, and less formal write-ups
on transit oriented blogs-and a positive
reception from the community and city, it
is unclear if BB led to changes in the zon-
ing in this area. City Council member Delia
Jasso expressed interest in piloting a Com-
plete Street-type intervention on Tyler Street
(between Eighth and Davis) (Appleton,
2010). Jasso also committed her support for
the concept, but says she has not had Oak
Cliff residents come to her and lobby for
these changes made. Jasso explains: "You
can show people what it looks like, but then
they have to get busy to raise money or
advocate for us to put money in the budget
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for it. I support Better Block, but I think
there should be more thought put into phase
two, which is neighborhood engagement,
and phase three, which is funding to make it
permanent" (Ross, 2012).
Longtime Oak Cliff resident Jacob Kurtz
expressed support for the project, but also
observed a mismatch of needs. Oak Cliff is
primarily a blue-collar working class com-
munity. With families busy working to make
ends meet, outdoor cafes and flower shops
smacks of the complexities of gentrification.
Roberts touches on some of the results of
the program. "If you go back to most Bet-
ter Block projects within a year or two,
something in the private space has occurred
that wasn't there before. Often people who
started businesses came here because they
saw the potential" (Ross, 2012). To be fair,
the innovation behind Roberts' BB inter-
vention was coupling the Complete Street
design with commercial activity. The two go
hand-in-hand to support each other, but to
combine them together in one tactical urban-
ist intervention is unique. BB's strength is
to illuminate the potential. The next step is
working with businesses and government
to invest in the area in a real and permanent
way.
WALK RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA
WHAT: Informal, unsanctioned, sign-
hanging to assist with wayfinding (including
walkability indicators) and thereby encour-
age walking in Raleigh
WHO: Matt Tomasulo
WHEN: January 2012 - present
NOW: Components of Walk Raleigh was
adopted into the city's pedestrian plan;
Walk Your City is a non-profit working on a
mobile wayfinding app; CityFabric a private
business
IMPACT: Components of Walk Raleigh
was adopted into the city's pedestrian plan.
However there is no information if the sig-
nage makes more people walk.
Matt Tomasulo says he was inspired to cre-
ate signage when a friend mentioned that it
really was not that far to walk from Glen-
wood South and Seaboard Station in Raleigh
(Shrader, 2012). Other reports say he was
frustrated with the pace of Raleigh's adop-
tion of a pedestrian plan (Snyder, 2012). As
a result, Tomasulo developed Walk Raleigh
as part of his thesis for his master's in city
planning degree. In January 2012, he and a
few friends hung 27 signs at three major in-
tersections in downtown Raleigh. Each sign
had a QR scan code where people can hold
their phones to scan the information and
receive a tailored pedestrian route (including
distance estimate) via Google Maps.
The project received a lot of coverage from
large national and international news sites,
such as the BBC and NPR. Walk Raleigh
gained a lot of attention due to the novelty
of the project-this appears to be the first
project of its kind to (at least) garner media
attention. While Walk Your City claims to
support similar wayfinding sign installation
projects, Walk Raleigh is the most famous
and garnered the most media attention
because it was first. The long-term implica-
tions of projects that do not receive atten-
tion-for example, the media attention is a
critical component that forces government
to act-suggest that they might have little
on-the-ground impact.
Although Walk Raleigh appeared popular
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from the press, Raleigh's city government
removed the signage due to posting without
a permit. Mitchell Silver, Raleigh's City
Planning Director, did not want to punish but
rather synergize. "Yes, they didn't get proper
permits, but it shows a level of passion
and commitment to a city and encourages
walking. We want to work with this younger
generation to capture that energy to build a
future city they want to see" (Kellner, 2012).
A few weeks later Silver met with Tomasulo
to discuss a three-month pilot program using
Walk Raleigh's signs on a donation basis.
Silver presented the pilot project proposal to
Raleigh's city council, which passed unani-
mously in March 2012 (Maguire, 2012).
In preparation for the vote, Tomasulo also
collected 1,000 signatures in support of the
signage (Slattery, 2012).
Despite this public showing of support for
the project, there is little information about
the actual impact of the signage and whether
it in fact increased walking. Tomasulo nor
others have publicly made steps to measure
the impact of the programs. However in
December 2012, Walk Raleigh transitioned
from a pilot project to a formalized compo-
nent within Raleigh's 2012 Comprehensive
Pedestrian Plan (Tomasulo, 2013b).
In May 2012, Tomasulo launched a success-
fully funded campaign, Walk Your City, on
Kickstarter. Walk Your City is a non-profit
organization that provides open-sourced,
guerrilla wayfinding templates for citizens
to create wayfinding signage for their cities
(Tomasulo, 2012). Since then, over 20 cities
have adopted similar Walk Your City proj-
ects around the United States.
Figure 6: Tomasulo and friend installing the guerrilla Walk Raleigh wayfinding signage,
Photo credit: Tomasulo, 2012.
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Walk Your City is also partner to a private
business. CityFabric is Tomasulo's private
company created to "Redefin[e] commu-
nity by stitching together people and places
through civic and social innovation, tactics
and design" (Tomasulo, 2013a). CityFabric
specializes in t-shirts, prints and other ac-
cessories with silkscreened maps of cities.
Their slogan is "wear you live" (Tomasulo,
2013a). CityFabric appears to financially
support Walk Raleigh, Walk Your City and
allows Tomasulo to continue to innovate in
this sphere.
GUERRILLA BIKE LANE SEPARA-
TORS ON BERGEN STREET
PROSPECT HEIGHTS BROOKLYN,
NEW YORK
WHAT: Unsanctioned installation of physi-
cal separators along existing bicycle lane to
reduce vehicles parking in bike lane
WHO: Ian Dutton, neighborhood resident
cum activist
WHEN: July - November 2012
NOW: Separators remain to discourage
parking within the existing bicycle lane.
IMPACT: NYPD installed temporary divid-
ers along the bike lane, physically prevent-
ing automobiles from parking in the bike
lane. As of April 2013 they are (still) present
and functioning (Makagon, 2013).
On July 19, 2012, Streetsblog reported the
installation of a guerrilla bike lane separator
on Bergen Street between Sixth Avenue and
Flatbush to discourage vehicles-New York
Police Department (NYPD) in particular-
from parking in the bicycle lanes (Fried,
2012). Local resident Ian Dutton claimed
responsibility for installing the intervention,
Figure 7: Guerrilla bicycle lane separators
on Bergen. Photo credit: Dutton, 2012.
calling it as a "fun 'suggestion' to keep au-
tomobiles from parking in the path (O'Neill,
2012b). He used leftover Con-Edison
construction posts from utility work down
the street, which worked until the company
needed them for another utility project
(Fried, 2012). On July 23, 2012 Streetsblog
reported the resurrection of the guerrilla
bike lane separators, this time not installed
by Ian Dutton. Many took this second effort
as a signal that the local bicycle community
did not feel safe when cars parked in the
bike lane. All in all the temporary separators
lasted six weeks (O'Neill, 2012b).
With the press involved, both the bicycle
lane users were able to voice their opinions:
"It's hard to use a lane if the NYPD is using
it as a parking lot" (O'Neill, 2012a). The
police were also given the opportunity to
voice their point of view explaining NYPD
only parked in the lane when there was no
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Figure 8: Barriers protecting Bergen Street bicycle lane. Photo credit: Makagon, 2013a.
other option. "It could be because a prisoner
needs to be taken in or a stray dog needs
to be transported" (O'Neill, 2012a). Both
parties used the press to openly express their
point of view.
As momentum picked up, Dutton took the
issue through the formal process of going
to the Community Board 6 and Commu-
nity Board 8 to lobby for a city-sanctioned
bicycle lane divider (O'Neill, 2012b). He
explained to the board that fewer vehicles
parked in the path when the temporary street
median was up, and when it came down
other cyclists maintained the lane and resur-
rected the barriers. "A very simple change
to the street resulted in a dramatically safer
experience for a great volume of cyclists. It
ended up being a giant team effort - it got a
really positive response" (O'Neill, 2012b).
The collective activism gained enough atten-
tion so the Department of Transportation got
involved. In November, in a clever show of
streetscape diplomacy, NYDP put up their
own barriers along the bicycle lanes as both
a sign of solidarity on the side of cyclists,
and a straight forward means of discourag-
ing parking in the bike path. "Word on the
street is that cyclists can thank 78th Precinct
Deputy Inspector Michael Ameri for the
barricades, though the precinct's community
affairs office credited the NYPD Barrier
Section" (Miller, 2012). While there are still
some kinks to be worked out-there is the
occasional vehicle still parked in the area-
the problem has largely been resolved,
according to the "activists" (Miller, 2012).
As of April 2013 the barriers are up, protect-
ing the bicycle lane (Makagon, 2013). Since
there is no media follow-up or recent cover-
age, it is not clear if the barriers have been
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up since November, or they were recently
reinstalled now that winter is over.
Under the leadership of Mayor Bloomberg
and Janette Sadik-Kanh, there has been a
huge shift to reprioritize pedestrian-oriented
public space and NMT in New York City.
Without Streetsblog and the urban planning
oriented media sites, little information would
be heard about interventions such as these.
The attention paid to this dispute appears to
be riding the energy of this city zeitgeist as
fueled by Streetsblog and other information
disseminators.
TAKEAWAYS FROM CASELETS
All projects are unsanctioned and therefore
have the "act first, ask for forgiveness later"
ethos.
. The founders all had deeper than novel
interest in city planning and street de-
sign. Some are professional planners or
traffic engineers.
. All founders have a physical presence in
the area and have been there and plan to
stay there for the long term. They have
long-term stake in the outcome.
. Constituency building, if it happened at
all, was quick and informal. Constitu-
ency building appears in the form of
longevity of project, or public demand
for the project.
. Online presence was a key to expand-
ing public interest. The Internet helped
generate enough momentum for outsid-
ers to take notice and, if shut down, ask
for it back.
. Catchy branding can be used to develop
into something more long-term. E.g.
Better Block, or Walk Raleigh.
. Each project is in a different phase of
recognition, varying between forming
a non-profit, a business, a public debate
between public sector interests and
departments, and the more predictable
model of institutionalizing the program
via government formalization. In order
for a project to have a longer-term life,
formalization by government is not the
only outcome.
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3. SAN FRANCISCO'S PARKLET PROGRAM
The most famous example of tactical urban-
ism turned city policy is the San Francisco's
Parklet Program. Urban legend claims San
Francisco's parklets evolved out of tactical
urbanist intervention PARK(ing) Day. In
spite of the acceptance of this narrative, it is
unclear what steps were made to formalize a
conceptual art piece within Pavement2Parks
(P2P) in San Francisco's Planning Depart-
ment. The case of San Francisco's (SF)
parklets demonstrates a full-cycle process of
formalizing a tactical urbanism intervention
as one critical component of a larger "cli-
mate of change" developing within the city.
By investigating the process of recognition
and formalization of the parklet program,
this chapter hopes to shed light on creative
practices to reform public policy.
WHAT: The urban legend between
PARK(ing) Day and San Francisco's park-
lets
WHO: Rebar Inc and San Francisco Plan-
ning
WHEN: 2005 - present
NOW: Formalized parklet program in San
Francisco Planning's Pavement2Parks
IMPACT: First parklet on Divisadero in
2010 and in January 2013 there were thirty-
eight parklets in existence (P2P, 2013b)
Figure 9: Parklet on 1331 9th Avenue, sponsored by Arizmendi Bakery
Photo credit: Jack Verdoni Architecture, 2011.
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SAN FRANCISCO'S PARKLET
PROGRAM WITHIN PAVEMENT
TO PARKS (P2P)
It's not that one thing sort of marked
and became something else; these things
actually are happening in the same
space at the same time. So the different
phases that you're talking about co-exist.
And they kind of occupy different pieces
of the activist spectrum-they engage
different people and it's interesting how
they can sort ofplay back andforth with
each other at the same time now that
both are mature.
- Blaine Merker, Principle of Rebar;
Co-Founder of PARK(ing) Day
Today the Parklet Program is housed within
SF Planning's P2P division. SF Planning's
P2P program is a collaborative effort be-
tween the SF Planning Department, the
Mayor's Office, the Department of Public
Works, and the San Francisco Municipal
Transit Authority (SFMTA). The P2P pro-
gram "seeks to temporarily reclaim these
unused swathes of land and quickly and
inexpensively turn them into new public
spaces" (Planning, n.d.). While the website
specifically denotes the spirit of "temporar-
ily" reclaiming the right-of-way (ROW) for
public use, the long-term objective is the
permanent reuse of space.
CREATING A "CLIMATE OF
CHANGE" IN SAN FRANCISCO
Upon deeper investigation, the evolution of
PARK(ing) Day to parklets is more com-
plex than the urban legend would have it.
Many different parties held independent and
overlapping activities that created a "climate
of change" in San Francisco. The climate of
change was created by six factors, occurring
at overlapping intervals, in rough non-linear
phases:
1. The city already demonstrated an active
and on-going commitment to improving
public space, and the parklets fit with the
broader vision.
2. Activists engaged the community and
inspired citizens and the city.
3. Civic leaders developed intense non-
profit activism around non-motorized
transportation and public space in San
Francisco.
4. San Francisco and New York engaged in
active city-to-city learning.
5. The parklet concept garnered key lead-
ership support in the form of dedicated
institutional capacity, continuous "green
lighting" of the project, and open dialogu-
ing between departments with overlapping
interests.
6. The private sector got on-board and saw
the parklets could be a "win-win" opportu-
nity.
7. The media served as a public awareness
illuminator and public perception shaper.
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1. The city already demonstrated an
active and on-going commitment
to improving public space, and the
parklets fit with the broader vision.
The political will was present and
different departments in government
saw an opportunity for them to gain
from. The common challenge faced
was a lack of capital to dedicate to
the cause.
By the time Rebar organized PARK(ing)
Day, the city already demonstrated its com-
mitment to bettering non-motorized trans-
portation (NMT) and public space. In fact,
leadership was already taking a pro-pedestri-
an space approach to projects.
One of the most famous public narratives
symbolizing the city's commitment to NMT
was the battle over Valencia Street. Valencia
is a major road that runs through the San
Francisco and the Mission, one of the larg-
est neighborhoods in the city. The Mission
houses a large Hispanic population. It is also
home to San Francisco's "hipster" com-
munity-young urbanites, artists, college
educated, and typically single in their 20s-
which represents a large portion of the city's
bicycle culture.
In the 1990s, the city wanted to turn Va-
lencia into an auto-centric arterial road to
connect the central freeway to the Golden
Gate Bridge (Fran Taylor, 2006). The SF
Bicycle Coalition (SFBC) organized the
bicycle community and pushed for an alter-
native plan that included bicycle lanes on
Valencia. This fight lasted for many years,
becoming heated enough that the director
of the Department of Parking and Traffic at
the time, publicly declared "They'll be bike
lanes on Valencia Street over my dead body"
(Fran Taylor, 2006; San Francisco Bicycle
Coalition, n.d.). In the end, the cyclists
won-of which the SFBC claims credit-
with Valencia Street becoming a high-use
central bicycle lane (San Francisco Bicycle
Coalition, n.d.). Valencia was an important
win for the cycling community; and today
Valencia is a symbolically important street
for the younger bicycle generation of urban-
ists (Metcalf, 2012).
Riding the wind of their success, the next
step was to make Valencia more pedestrian
friendly. In February 2006, the Board of
Supervisors adopted San Francisco's Better
Streets Policy (SF Better Streets, n.d.). "The
Better Streets Plan creates a unified set of
standards, guidelines, and implementation
strategies to govern how the City designs,
builds, and maintains its pedestrian environ-
ment... the process brings together staff
of multiple City agencies to comprehen-
sively plan for streets" (SF Better Streets,
n.d.). The San Francisco Municipal Transit
Authority (SFMTA), in partnership with
other city organizations, began to rethink the
public right-of-way (ROW) in accordance to
the Better Streets plan.
But it took a lot of time and effort to get
to this point. Due to a fragmented political
structure, streets in San Francisco primarily
stayed the same for 50 years (Papandreou,
2013). The streets of 2005-apart from
signature streets like Market Street or Em-
barcadero-looked like the streets of 1950.
Many different departments were technically
in charge of the public ROW. The process
was decentralized so completely that the
process became stuck in its own fragmenta-
tion.
It took the mandate of the Better Streets
plan for government to seriously examine
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the current functionality of sidewalks and
the pedestrian realm. "City Hall advocates,
members of the public, city agencies were
coming around to this idea of, 'We can really
rethink our public rights-of-way' (Reiskin,
2013). The development of the Better
Streets Plan created momentum around
rethinking the public ROW to facilitate pe-
destrian activity rather than funnel automo-
biles through the city (Papandreou, 2013).
These conversations developed concrete
outcomes that should be implemented into
Better Streets, such as identifying minimum
sidewalk widths, lighting types, and sustain-
able design features like water recirculation.
However the accumulation of these ideas
developed into another large capital expense
project, which ran head on into the tight fis-
cal reality of the times.
When the Great Recession hit in 2008,
funding evaporated. Though leadership and
vision remained, with it included the realiza-
tion the city might never be able to afford
large pedestrian infrastructure investments
again (Metcalf, 2012). It was around this
time that New York City started experiment-
ing with urban plazas and NMT restructuring
(Papandreou, 2013). By this time PARK(ing)
became PARK(ing) Day, gaining more
prominence and national and international
attention. Leaders in San Francisco began
to ask how the city could do more projects
centered around an informal, incremental,
pilot process (Papandreou, 2013).
When Janette Sadik-Kanh (JSK), Commis-
sioner of the New York City Department of
Transportation, visited San Francisco, much
of the conversation focused around the need
to invent inexpensive NMT infrastructure
solutions (Metcalf, 2012). New York's ap-
proach steered away from the traditional
capital project process and accomplished
the basic reallocation of public space with
low cost approaches (e.g. paint markers),
or political moves (e.g. commandeering the
space away from cars) (Papandreou, 2013).
"I think it helped broaden our thinking when
Janette came and told us what she was doing
in New York. There's a spectrum of ways of
approaching this right-of-way transforma-
tion, some ways such as the plazas and then
the parklets could be done a lot faster and
easier and can help sew the seeds for future,
long-term permanent work" (Reiskin, 2013).
As the U.S. entered this new era of austerity,
light, temporary, tested-by-piloting projects
grew more attractive as they provided faster
results than traditional capital projects that
typically took years to come to fruition.
The growing buzz around innovative alter-
natives to capital projects began to coalesce
around the idea of increasing public space
with little funds. The process happened
"synergistically" between departments
where leaders began to seriously consider
reallocating excess parking spaces or road
space for public space: creating parklets (Pa-
pandreou, 2013). "Could we do something
that was more cost effective, more dynamic,
that was kind of like testing the water of the
public because at the end of the day we're
taking away what was seen as an entitlement
[parking], a free resource for the public, and
replacing it with something that was not
exactly what they thought they wanted to or
that was potentially viewed as a business-
oriented space versus a public-oriented
space" (Papandreou, 2013). Parklets were
something small, achievable, and potentially
very powerful in reshaping public space in
a city.
The process hinges on self-selection. Those
merchants that want parklets apply and
follow the rules, regulations and process
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protocol. Those who do not want it, or can-
not get sufficient community buy-in to sup-
port the application, will not apply. "These
parklets are kind of helping us test the water
right now and the appetite by the merchants
and the public to extend these further out"
(Papandreou, 2013).
Opponents of parklets cite the repurposing
(or removal) of metered parking as a key
complaint. One might assume the SFMTA
would also be opposed to repurposing
metered parking since it is a revenue source
that directly supports mass transit-another
agency mandate.
2. Activists engaged the community,
inspired citizens and the city: Rebar
created PARK(ing) Day.
I think the PARK(ing) Day project
doesn't get enough credit. It was really
an important moment. When I think of
this movement that I've been part of-the
Livable Streets movement-you can trace
it back to the advent of the motor vehicle
on city streets, the public started pushing
against it; you can trace it back to Jane
Jacobs; you can trace it to the Earth Day
era in the 1970s; but this latest phase of
the Livable Streets movement that we're
in now... I actually think that you can
trace this phase of the movement back to
PARK(ing) Day.
- Aaron Naparstek, Founder and For-
mer Editor-in-Chief ofStreetsblog
In 2005 a group of artists-Matthew
Passmore, Blaine Merker, and John Bela,
founders of the Rebar Group Incorporat-
ed-critiqued SF Planning's latest master
plan. They discovered there was no plan to
add green space to the Mission District. In
their description of PARK(ing) Day, Rebar
writes: "More than 70% of San Francisco's
downtown outdoor space is dedicated to
the private vehicle, while only a fraction of
that space is allocated to the public realm"
(Rebar Group Inc., 2005).
Together the artists brainstormed ways to
creatively highlight this missing component
in a fun and whimsical way: what if me-
tered parking could be considered a mixed-
use space? They researched the legality
of transforming a metered parking space,
and developed the idea to turn the metered
parking into a kind of park. (In SF the user
actually rents the space, as oppose to paying
for permission to park.) Rather than breaking
rules and "asking for forgiveness later"-the
modus operandi of tactical urbanism today-
Rebar looked for loopholes in the system to
exploit. "[W]e researched the code before-
hand so we knew that... we were not break-
ing the law. We knew that we were operating
legally... exploiting a legal loophole to...
make a point" (Merker, 2013).
In November 2005, the group trundled down
to the Mission with a tree, sod, bench, and
set up a "park" in parking space the two-
hour meter permitted. The cost of materials
totaled $200. They got some funny looks
from the meter maids and pedestrians, took
a few good images it, and went on their way.
To publicize the event, Rebar distributed
images to friends active on the blogosphere,
most notably to Matthew Passmore's wife,
Christine, who wrote about the project on
the well-known eco-lifestyle blog Super-
hero Journal. It was branded as a conceptual
art piece to increase public green space in
the Mission. Within a few days the im-
ages went viral, with individuals across the
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U.S. contacted them asking how they could
replicate it on their own (Passmore, 2013).
When the PARK(ing) image landed in Aaron
Naparstek's-founding editor and creator of
Streetsblog-email in New York, this photo
went viral within the urban planning and
civil society communities there (Naparstek,
2013). In once succinct image, Rebar cap-
tured the zeitgeist of the times of a move-
ment that both questioned and inspired the
re-thinking of the use of automobile space.
In response, Rebar produced materials and
entered the speaking circuit to grow the
dialogue around issues of public space and
automobiles in cities. Rebar developed a
free "How To" manual and posted it on
their website at the end of 2005/ early 2006.
Passmore began to speak on behalf of the
group to academic conference and other
public speaking opportunities. In September
of 2006, the artists re-congregated and held
an official PARK(ing) Day. In sequential
years, PARK(ing) Day continued to garner
national and international attention, where it
is currently celebrated as World PARK(ing)
Day. It is considered a safe and benign way
for cities to support citizens exploring a new
vision of their city.
Passmore emphasizes Rebar had no long-
term vision for PARK(ing) Day, and was
more of an experiment to see what the
project would do and how the public would
respond. In fact, at that time they were not
Rebar yet. They were an unnamed group of
artists that went to graduate school together.
Despite this lack of long-term planning, Re-
bar recognized the importance of PARK(ing)
Day remaining free. More recently Rebar
fielded offers from companies-Starbucks
to soft drink and automobile companies-
to buy the rights to PARK(ing) Day for
commercial use (Merker, 2013). Today
PARK(ing) Day remains a free and public
good with the only requirement attributing
credit to Rebar.
The only official government response they
received was an offer of support from the
Mayor's Office without making it an official
program (Passmore, 2013). The government
appeared hesitant about over committing and
stifling the creative, whimsical energy that
this initiative generated by regulating it.
Through PARK(ing) Day, Rebar modeled
what could be done by physically demon-
strating "What if?" They created a civic
"prototype" to playfully reimagine public
space in an urban area. PARK(ing) provided
such a broad starting point, it could be easily
replicated in other cities for communities to
reimagine their own use of public space. But
Rebar's involvement in the production of the
first parklet or public plaza in San Francisco
ended there (Power, 2013). In their role
they figuratively "stirred the pot," sparked
a whimsical public brainstorm, and inspired
others in various cities to run with the idea
and explore it on their own terms.
3. Civic leaders developed intense
non-profit activism around non-
motorized transportation and public
space in San Francisco.
Residents of San Francisco and the wider
Bay Area are legendary for their citizen
activism. This legacy gained infamy during
the anti-Vietnam War protests at University
of California Berkeley, the free love move-
ment along Haight-Ashbury in the city in
the 1960s. The history of an engaged public
manifests itself in continued action today.
"In an age renowned for citizen apathy and
for mistrust of both politics and government
in America, San Franciscans are, compara-
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tively speaking, highly engaged as well as
highly tolerant culturally" (Briggs, 2008).
The history of liberal, leftist activism con-
tinues and filters into many different aspects
of daily life-including a robust non-profit
activism sector.
In the urban planning and non-motorized
transportation (NMT) subsectors, SPUR and
SFBC are very strong organizations. The
San Francisco Planning and Urban Research
Association (SPUR) established itself in
1910 as a response to the great earthquake of
1906. The organization self-describes their
mission as the promotion of "good planning
and good governance" in the city (SPUR,
n.d.). Founded in 1971, the San Francisco
Bicycle Coalition (SFBC) is a cornerstone
of NMT activism in the city. They are one
of the most established NMT activist groups
and cite the Valencia Street bicycle lanes as
a serious accomplishment.
In 2009, SPUR and the SFBC, along with
support from New York-based organiza-
tions the Project for Public Spaces (PPS)
and the Livable Streets Initiative developed
the San Francisco Great Streets Project. It
would make sense that Great Streets came
to be as a result of JSK's 2008 visit. Even
its name, Great Streets, appears inspired by
New York's Livable Streets project-another
example of coalition building to advocate for
pedestrian-oriented use of public space. The
lines and boundaries between Great Streets
and the SFBC appear very fluid. Great
Streets served as a high-level intermediary
that brought together visionaries for higher
level buy-in and dialogue (SFBC Represen-
tative, 2013).
While Great Streets advocated for many
different projects that supported the public
and civic life in San Francisco, one of Great
Streets primary functions appears to have
been a partnership product created to support
the emergence of the Parklet program. It was
a three-year initiative that ended in 2012.
They worked closely with the Astrid Haryati,
Greening Director of the Mayor's Office;
spoke with business to listen and commu-
nicate ideas about the Great Streets project;
and also conducted small research studies
(SFBC Representative, 2013). The program
had an informal partnership with the Depart-
ment of Planning; though the strategy was
informal, there was a good relationship be-
tween the team and the planning department
staff (SFBC Representative, 2013).
One of the most serious contributions Great
Streets provided was by serving as a public
awareness service, gaining public momen-
tum and educating the community about
the parklet program. It conducted both a
before and after survey assessment of the
first parklet on Divisadero Street, in front of
Mojo's Caf6. "Our [Great Streets] research
found that after the parklet was installed,
pedestrian activity, pedestrian satisfaction,
and the sense of community character in
the area had increased" (San Francisco Great
Streets Project, n.d.). Quantifying the impact
of the first parklet in front of Mojo's, Great
Streets found:
. Pedestrian traffic rose 37% on week-
nights.
. The average number of pedestrians
increased 13%.
. The average number of people sitting
or standing increased 30%
. Sense of "community character" in-
creased from 80% to 90%
. Nearby businesses are evenly split
between whether they agree the par-
klet should be made perma-
nent or not (Great Streets, 2010).
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In addition to the Great Streets program
working as a public coalition service, SFBC
continued to work the community, organiz-
ing and spreading the gospel of parklets.
It was the SFBC that approached Remy
Nelson, owner of Mojo Bicycle, about the
possibility of hosting the first parklet for the
city program.
Organizations like SFBC were able to
deliver messages to the public that the city
was not comfortable expressing. Current
P2P Parklet Manager Paul Chasan: "There
are tactics that you use from working outside
the bureaucracy as an advocate... and there's
things that you do from within the bureau-
cracy... [I]f I was an insider, that wouldn't
be the same tactics, but it's all pushing
towards the same sorts of goals" (Chasan,
2013). Parties are working towards the same
end goals while relaying and distributing the
material and content they are most effec-
tive at disseminating. Chasan describes this
advocacy strategy as one with a "soft touch"
(Chasan, 2013). Both the government and
civil society remained autonomous enti-
ties with their own interests, but the areas
where civil society and government found
overlapping causes-the parklets a powerful
example-created a mutually beneficially
and symbiotic relationship.
The movement gained financial support from
Silicon Valley. Jonathan Weiner, a successful
Silicon Valley entrepreneur who co-founded
FinePrint,4 attended several of these meet-
ings and eventually sponsored programs to
support the parklet network. Weiner helped
fund the Great Streets program with a
$50,000 grant, and later hired Rebar to cre-
ate a parklet prototype (Metcalf, 2012).
Great Streets also worked to educate and
inform business owners and residents about
the benefits of parklets, and displacement of
parking. There was real concern from people
that regularly depended on these metered
spaces. Parking in San Francisco is limited
and becomes a sensitive issue when people
perceive it is as under threat. Great Street,
Kit Hodges, worked with business owners
and talked to them to explain the program
and quell their fears about a lack of parking.
4. San Francisco and New York en-
gaged in active city-to-city learning.
[Wie kind of looked around the room at
ourselves and said, 'You know, there's
no reason why we can 't do that here. If
she [Janette Sadik-Kahn] can do that on
Broadway in mid-town Manhattan, we
can do that in San Francisco. 'So, we put
together a group offolks to look at plaza
ideas, and kind of really lifted right from
New York.
- Ed Reiskin, Director of SFMTA; For-
mer Director ofPublic Works referring
to a senior meeting with Janette Sadik-
Kahn, New York City Transportation
Commissioner
The SFBC organized a speaker series where
city leaders that made a dramatic improve-
ment in non-motorized transportation
would come and share their experiences and
insights. Over the period of a few years, the
SFBC brought in a veritable "who's who"'
of successful NMT and public space "game
changers." They brought in Enrique Pe-
fialosa (former Mayor of Bogota, Columbia),
among others. Like Livable Streets and the
NYC Renaissance Campaign, they engaged
in high-level city-to-city learning by bring-
ing in former mayors, city planners, and
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any successful "game changer" that had a
dramatic impact on the reshaping of public
and NMT space in their respective cities.
A key organizer in both New York and San
Francisco campaigns was Kit Hodge-and
her organizational "fingerprints" and impact
was imprinted in both NY and SF organiza-
tions overall strategy.
In this series of talks, the SFBC led the
charge and organized a trip with Commis-
sioner of the New York City Department
of Transportation Janette Sadik-Khan in
2008-an important city tour of "who's
who" in the political power spectrum, and
who influences who and what over public
space and NMT. During this visit, she also
spoke with city leaders (mayor, other public
and non-profit) regarding New York City's
strategic use of incremental change via their
pilot projects. Meeting officials included San
Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom, SFMTA
Director Nathaniel Ford, SF Planning Direc-
tor John Rahaim, Public Works Director
Ed Reiskin, SF Bicycle Coalition leaders,
Rebar, SPURS Director Gabriel Metcalf, and
other civic leaders.
JSK's visit made a tremendous impact
on civic leaders in San Francisco. Every
single interview conducted for this thesis
research-with the exception of the private
sector because this came later-cited her
visit as a seminal moment (Chasan, 2013;
Merker, 2013; Metcalf, 2012; Naparstek,
2013; Papandreou, 2013; Passmore, 2013;
Power, 2013; Reiskin, 2013; SFBC Repre-
sentative, 2013). This city-to-city learning
helped SF leaders rethink how to implement
projects that were once deemed impossible
without funding. Rather than the more tra-
ditional approach of developing large-scale
capital projects, JSK presented a spectrum of
incremental strategies that add up to serious
improvements.
The P2P website has unmistakable marks of
the influence of JSK's visit. Right up front
the site announces, "San Francisco's Pave-
ment to Parks projects are inspired by the re-
cent success of similar projects in New York
City"' (Planning, n.d.). P2P brands itself as a
"public laboratory" for the city in partnership
to work with local communities to pilot new
ideas, with some projects eventually becom-
ing permanent (Planning, n.d.).
Andres Power, former Manager for Pave-
ment2Parks, also acknowledges the influ-
ence of Janette Sadik-Kahn's (JSK) work in
New York City on San Francisco. "We were
sort of, in sort of parallel or slightly behind
the work that New York City was doing
under Janette Sadik-Kahn... testing the idea
of temporary interventions in the public
right-of-way" (Power, 2013) The testing by
piloting, and creating a new development
typology using temporary materials appears
to be inspired by JSK-and perhaps her visit
to SF too. "We were looking at ways to fur-
ther expand the Pavement to Parks program
and we began with a series of plaza spaces,
sort of very similar with what was happen-
ing in New York City and we wanted to
come up with, a development typology that
was quicker to implement and easier to get
in places that perhaps, you know, creating
a plaza was not necessarily the appropriate
solution for the location" (Power, 2013). San
Francisco's new approach to institutional-
ize a more universally applicable design
typology appears highly influenced by the
city-to-city exchanges that took place in San
Francisco.
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5. The parklet concept garnered
key leadership support in the form
of dedicated institutional capacity,
continuous "green lighting" of the
project, and open dialoguing be-
tween departments with overlapping
interests.
"[W]ith Pavement2Parks we said...
we're not designing by consensus, we're
not going to necessarily respond to
everyone ' desires, we're going to listen
to the city input but we're going to make
an executive decision and moveforward
And we did that because the Mayor '
office, which technically oversees ... sits
on top of all the agencies, was involved
'We'll takefeedback and make a deci-
sion, 'and not 'We'll takefeedback and
do what you say. '"1
-Andres Power; Former Manager,
Pavement2Parks on the process of
implementing thefirstparklet
There was a lot of public and political
support surrounding the idea of improved
public space. After JSK's visit, this support
only strengthened. San Francisco's Mayor
Newsom, already worked in partnership with
SF Planning on projects that fell under what
Newsom referred to as "green wave" proj-
ects (Power, 2013). Newsom's categorized
"green wave" projects as those which took
a broad approach to sustainability, which
included urban design as a component of
urban sustainability too (Power, 2013).
Under this umbrella, Andres Power, former
Manager for Pavement2Parks, developed
a relationship with Newsom's administra-
tion by collaborating on urban streetscape
projects (traditional capital improvement).
When the non-traditional ideas of improv-
ing public space by reclaiming the right-
of-way (ROW) came to SF via JSK, Power
championed the P2P initiative. By the time
these ideas filtered down the command
chain, and key political support already had
been gained-from the Mayor's Office, SF
Planning Department, Public Works Depart-
ment, SFMTA-with everyone onboard with
this mission. When leadership in SF Plan-
ning empowered Andres Power to lead the
charge, the organization dedicated sufficient
"capacity" to thoroughly explore the logis-
tics and mechanics of developing a project
that fit within the strict criteria of tight
budgetary confinements and big public space
transformation aspirations.
The beauty of the public plazas and the par-
klets, and the messaging around them, was
that there was something in it for everyone.
The SF Planning Department could cham-
pion an innovative project that promotes
public space-becoming a "culture of yes"
(Chasan, 2013). The Mayor's Office could
support its mission for improved environ-
mental sustainability by increasing green
space and improving the pedestrian zone.
The Department of Public Works could
prove new and innovative by re-thinking the
use and strategy behind the public right-
of-way (Reiskin, 2013). SFMTA could be
one step closer to improving the pedestrian
network by widening and increasing pedes-
trian space (Papandreou, 2013). The private
sector could use the parklets to attract more
patrons. Sponsors of the parklet could attract
publicity. The community around the par-
klet, and those that frequented those neigh-
borhoods, would receive more public space.
The non-profit sector and civil society pri-
oritized the project to fit under their domain,
making it a success that they could claim as
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Figure 10: Building the first parklet in front
of Mojo's Cafe. Photo credit: Shaw, 2012.
their own. Everyone took ownership for it at
some point in the project timeline.
JSK shared a low cost, and innovative
strategy-based around an incremental
process-that would allow the city to go
forth with these various missions in a time
of budgetary tightness. When conversations
around these ideas of improving the public
space took hold, the political support was
already in place-most notably, the mayor's.
Strategically P2P was publicly named as an
initiative led by the Mayor's Office, instead
of an individual department. This gave both
power and leeway to Power. "We named the
initiative as being one that championed by
the Mayor's office as opposed to an indi-
vidual department which then allowed me
to basically sort of steamroll the program"
(Power, 2013). While Power did most of the
heavy lifting, in terms of day-to-day project
management, on the ground strategizing,
and overall program implementation, he
had key allies that helped him push through
the initiative. One of which was Ms. Astrid
Haryati, Greening Director of the Mayor's
Office, and a strong Public Works Depart-
ment (Power, 2013).
P2P's first project was Castro's Jane Warner
Plaza. Power acknowledges the old adage
"lyou only have one try to do it right" when
he talks about the need to put something
physical on the ground. [M]y takeaway
was that all we need to do is put. . . put one
project on the ground and show that we can
be successful and to do it at stealthily as
possible so that it just shows up. And we did
that... [W]e had to go through, you know,
some expedited sort of approval pass, but
we really tried really hard to keep this, sort
of out of the traditional, sort of, bureaucratic
process that sort of revolves around, that's
sort of tied to more traditional projects"
(Power, 2013). This process both deviated
from conventional processes by collaborat-
ing with outsiders, while sticking to norms
by incubating in secret for a time period
(Kohli, 2011).
In terms of community support, other public
plazas were built around sites-such as the
Jane Warner Plaza-that were under study
and debate for 10+ years. Rather than open
the space for a renewed public debate, Power
used the past community input and various
studies as justification of sufficient pub-
lic participation. When they needed more
current input Power spoke with established
neighborhood organizations, in this case
the merchant's association (Power, 2013).
The strategy closely followed that of Janette
Sadik-Khan where the public plaza would
start as a temporary plaza and if the commu-
nity accepted it, it would become permanent
(Power, 2013).
5 Rebar did., however, design the second parklet. Which, after the prqject was labeled a success, appears to be a lower risk
endeavor, with lower risk to damaging the brand or being seen as "co-opted" by the government.
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The parklets came after the plazas, with the
first parklet going up in front of Mojo's Caf6
in March 2010 (Roth, 2010). Power is quick
to give recognition to Rebar for starting the
public dialogue about what else a parking
space could be. The parklets were inspired
by PARK(ing) Day, but they did not help
implement the first prototype on the ground
(Power, 2013). Rebar assisted in develop-
ing designs for parklets later on, but for this
first parklet,5 they did not contribute to the
implementation or push the idea genera-
tion process further. Riyad Ghannam of RG
Architecture, an architect and member of the
SFBC, designed the first parklet pro bono.
The SFBC approached Ghannam to design
the project, as he was already engaged in is-
sues of NMT and public space being a SFBC
member, and with his skills as an architect,
he might consider "giving back" to the SF
community.
Power acknowledges the real innovation
behind the parklet project lay in the innova-
tive implementation process it created. To
avoid a dramatically slowed down process,
P2P bucked the city's traditional bureau-
cratic and decentralized process of design-
ing by consensus and committee, and took
a slightly more top-down approach. "[In
San Francisco] traditional projects they get
watered down because they have to meet
every single, you know, design criteria that
everyone might have that are often conflict-
ing... because of that it can take years to get
anything through sort of the process. And so
with Pavement to Parks we said... we're not
going to necessarily respond to everyone's
desires, we're going to listen to the sort of
city input but we're going to make an execu-
tive decision and move forward" (Power,
2013).
Notably most of these types of innovative
projects have support from the top political
offices and decision-makers-after all, San
Francisco is known for cutting-edge policy,
innovative policy makers and whimsical
and innovative initiatives, especially in the
vanguard of environmental sustainability.
The communication gap falls short in the
lower levels of the political systems-the
"street level bureaucrats"-that have the
most interaction and become the face of
the government. P2P was able to take this
approach-effectively strong-arming its
way through certain parts of the bureau-
cratic process-because the initiative was
technically housed, and therefore came out
of, the Mayor's Office. Having the mayor's
support empowered Power to "cut through"
the process (Power, 2013). The city is most
concerned about issues of public safety
(Reiskin, 2013), so various concerns and
scenarios were voiced to Power. "Every rea-
son why it was a bad idea... was floated and
I took that input and designed around that
input and got the project done. And now ev-
ery project subsequently has been eminently
easier" (Power, 2013).
The process of design and use of materials
was based on the idea of light, temporary
and by nature of these two components,
cheap. The budget for the first parklet was a
mere $5,000 (Power, 2013). Working with
RG Architecture, Ghannam designed the
parklet and identified material types and
sources. Power would then approach the
manufactures of the materials, talk to them
about the project, the budget, and ask if
they would consider donating the materials
for the public good in exchange for some
publicity on the on-site parklet signage. All
companies said yes, with some as far away
as Denver, Colorado donating their deck-
ing, including shipping it out to San Fran-
cisco and flying their workers out to install
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Figure 11: The Parklet-O-Matic infographic is a graphic representation created by SF Planning
Departments to illustrate the parklet permitting process (SF Planning Department, 2013).
it (Power, 2013). On a cold and rainy day
in March 2010, Power, along with Remy
Nelson, volunteers from SFBC and Mojo
Bicycle employees completed the installa-
tion for the first parklet.
"I think ultimately what's innovative about
that program is the process and the way that
it's able to deliver projects quickly, relatively
inexpensively... completely responsive to
what it is that people want... whatever it's
use or whatever the design typology is...
perhaps it's a Pavement to Parks installa-
tion of, I mean something that I can't even
imagine" (Power, 2013).
As a key overseer of the public ROW, the
Department of Public Works (DPW) sup-
ported it. Through and ad hoc process, they
determined a permit structure and content to
ensure it would remain safe for the public
and properly maintained (Reiskin, 2013).
When they determined the project would
be funded primarily with private funds, the
DPW established their role was guiding
and facilitating the ROW. "And we quickly
found ... and we were able to do it largely
with private money so that the people who
wanted it, they ... they ... we gave them
parameters, they put it in, you know, so
they installed it, they maintain it, so it was,
you know, very little public money or effort
required. We were just playing the role of
facilitating the conversion of the right-of-
way" (Reiskin, 2013).
The DPW took a more active role earlier in
the project pipeline. I was able to play a
pretty active role since it didn't fit into any
one specific job section" (Reiskin, 2013). "1
mean, what works for us is we had a willing
partner who wanted to do it, we was will-
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THE PARKLET PROCESS
Parklets are a public space that are owned by the city but operated and maintained by the
private sector. Most language is taken directly from the P2P Request for Proposals for Parklets
2013.
. Community Benefit Districts (CBDs), Business Improvement Districts (BlDs), Non-profits, com-
munity organizations, schools, property owners, business owners and similar organizations can
apply to host a parkiet (P2P, 2013a). There are currently 200+ applications on the waiting list
(Chasan, 2013).
. Parklets are typically installed on streets of 25 mph or less and set back one parking space
from intersections (P2P, 2013a).
. Parklet sponsor pays $1,632+ initially for the space-$791.00 base fee for all applications;
$650.00 for up to two parking meter removals (only if meters currently exist); and $191.50 for
site inspection before and after installation. ($285.00 Additional base fee for each parking stall
beyond the first two; and $325.00 Additional fee for each additional meter removal beyond the
first two) (P2P, 2013a).
. All yearly renewals will be charged a $221 flat fee (P2P, 2013a).
. Sponsor submits a design proposal to the city, verifying all safety concerns, etc. (Chasan,
2013).
. Sponsor is responsible for all costs associated with design and installation of the Parklet. Par-
klets typically cost around $7,000 to $12,000 per parking space, depending on design factors
and material choices (P2P, 2013a).
. The sponsor is responsible for costs associated with the removal of the Parklet (P2P, 2013a).
. Hosts are required to provide at least $1 M in liability insurance - the same requirement as
sidewalk caf6 tables and chairs - naming the City and County of San Francisco as additional
insured. Most businesses already carry this insurance; please check with your provider (P2P,
2013a).
. Sponsors are required to sign a maintenance agreement to keep the Parklet free of debris,
grime, and graffiti, and to keep all plants in good health. They must maintain the surface of the
Parklet daily and rinse out the area beneath the Parkiet at least once a week. The Department
of Public Health may require them to provide pest abatement beneath the Parklet platform (P2P,
2013a).
. Any movable items, such as tables and chairs, must either be locked down at night or taken
inside. All tables and chairs must be different than what you may already be using as part of
your business (P2P, 2013a).
. Parklets are free and open to all members of the public to use. Sponsors are responsible for
ensuring that there is no table service on your parklet, including placement of condiments or
napkins (P2P, 2013a). No smoking, no alcohol permits allowed, no private vending or excluding
of citizens byway of vending, etc (Chasan, 2013; Nelson, 2013; Planning, n.d.).
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ing to put some money into it, so that's how
those came to be. After that, we turned it in,
and this is really where Andres kind of took
the reigns and became kind of a program
manager, he developed a competitive or kind
of a solicitation where we at DPW devel-
oped a... criteria working with MTA and
Planning and then we did a call for propos-
als. Just say, 'Here are the parameters and if
you want a parklet"' (Reiskin, 2013).
The SFMTA views parklets as a tool that
supports pedestrian activity, which in turn
support their mandate to improve walkabil-
ity and quality of life for the citizens of San
Francisco. The very long-term goal for this
program is to make the parklets permanent
and connect throughout the streets and city.
This effort would effectively create a bou-
levard via sidewalk extensions, creating a
wider pedestrian zone. The cafd load (people
sitting) would be taken off the sidewalk and
redistributed to the permanent parklet area,
freeing up the sidewalk to be used for pedes-
trian activity (Papandreou, 2013).
While walking is the cheapest modes for the
city to manage, expanding the infrastructure
to support it is expensive to deliver since it
would require widening the roads. "[W]e've
noticed the utility and the value of that, so
wherever we can make more comfortable
public spaces, that's definitely the reason
why we support this whole-heartedly...
waving any of the revenue that we're losing
on the parking meters" (Papandreou, 2013).
SFMTA acknowledges the costs of removing
meters are worth the long-term benefits of
supporting the parklets.
Figure 12: Parklet in front of Mojo's Cafe, 639 Divisidero Street Parklet.
Photo credit: SF Planning Department, 2012b.
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Figure 13: People sitting at the 639 Divi-
sidero Street Parklet. Photo credit: Shaw,
2010.
6. Private sector got on-board and
saw the parklets could be a "win-
win" for all. Now the parklet program
is a more mature program facing
growing pains with the relation-
ship between business support and
public ownership continuing to be
stretched.
What is the value of having to maintain
a public park ifyou just don't make
any money off of it...? ... We're [small
business owners] already working sixty,
seventy hours a week... When I started
my business I said what most people say
when they're starting a business, 'I don't
want to do this for money, '[and] that's
all true. I do love what I do, I do like my
community, and I love being [a small
business owner]. It ' totally awesome.
I'm not going to say it ' not awesome.
And the parklets, just like everything
else, is part ofyour business, it takes
up your time, you have to make some
money.
-Remy Nelson, Owner of Mojo Cafi
and sponsor of San Francisco first
parklet
The private sector-in this case small busi-
nesses especially-played a critical role in
the implementation of the parklets because
they fund and care for the parklets. A mutu-
ally beneficial agreement was made where
the city found that parklets compliment busi-
ness needs, and business financially funds
the parklets, thus serving city needs.
In 2009 a representative from the Great
Streets program contacted Remy Nelson,
owner of Mojo Cafi, about the prospect of
hosting the city's very first parklet. Mojo
Cafd was in its fourth year of operation and
had garnered a lot of media attention for
being the first hybrid cafd and bicycle shop,
right in the heart of the city on Divisadero
Street. The location, branding, and user base
(cyclists, coffee shop goers) seemed a good
fit. In other words, Great Streets engaged the
private sector through community organizing
and chose an appropriate place they thought
would "stick" well. The Great Streets rep put
Nelson in touch with Andres Power of SF
Planning and they began to work out a way
to facilitate and make it happen.
Being the first always comes with more risk
than an already established program. Nelson
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spoke to the idea of "giving back" to the
community that he grew up in. Born and
raised in San Francisco, owning a bicycle
cafd, when the idea fell in his lap along with
the added responsibility, it still was a risk
worth taking.
The first parklet came to fruition through a
slightly different process than the current
parklets. In a concerted effort to get it done,
exceptions were made. Nelson received the
space for free, where current parklet hosts
pay $1,500-2,000 despite the rule that busi-
ness is only a host and never owns the space.
With the help of the P2P program all the
building materials were donated by vari-
ous companies, WG Architects designed the
parklet pro bono, and Nelson, his employees,
along with volunteers from the SFBC actu-
ally built the parklet (Nelson, 2013).
The most profitable exception to the rule
Nelson received was an alcohol license from
the state's Alcohol Beverage Control (ABC).
"[S]ince the City never created any legisla-
tion to allow the sale of alcohol on a parklet,
there wasn't really any legislation [around
it]... If the ABC had done their homework
correctly when I threw this request to them
they would have denied it. But since they
didn't really do it right, I have it" (Nelson,
2013). That said, despite the facilitation
of goods, materials and processes by P2P,
Nelson recognizes that it was not an easy
process.
The parklets had champions at various levels
of government. At the upper levels of city
government (Mayors Office, SF Planning
Department, SFMTA, Department of Pub-
lic Works) and at the district level, Nel-
son worked closely with (former) District
Supervisor Ross Mirkarimi. "He was the one
who actually made the parklet happen. Give
credit to whoever you want, [Mikarimi] was
the one who brought everybody together"
(Nelson, 2013).
Nelson talks frankly about the tension be-
tween private sector needs and requirements
and the public and non-profit sector's lack of
acknowledgement regarding these needs. As-
suming that SFBC and Mojo Cafd, with their
shared bicycle roots, would be natural allies
that probably crossed paths if not worked
together via the Great Streets program, Nel-
son quickly corrected this assumption. "I run
a business, they run a non-profit... I don't
think they understand what running a busi-
ness entails... looking at business owners as
more fat cats than partners" (Nelson, 2013).
The government partnership appears to be
more blithely unaware of business needs
than a direct misunderstanding of back-
grounds, missions and needs.
7. The media served as a public
awareness illuminator and public
perception shaper.
Google "PARK(ing) Day and San Francis-
co's parklet program" and 20,700 results will
appear which link the two events together.
In fact, much of the "urban legend" of the
parklet program came from the media. The
media gave a lot of credit to Rebar link-
ing PARK(ing) to the fruition of the parklet
program.
The more in-depth stories and some of the
very first reporting on the topic came from
Streetsblog San Francisco. Since mainstream
media typically does not cover a story until
there is an official announcement, a lot of
urban planning developments flew under the
radar. Simultaneously local media is dying
and with it the opportunity for local cover-
age widened. Streetsblog-founded in New
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York in 2005 by Aaron Naparstek-deserves
credit for cracking open this niche. The city-
to-city learning efforts between New York
and San Francisco can be tracked to the first
development PARK(ing), but without the
blogesphere, and the new urban planning-
centric media, it is hard to gauge how much
traction an obscure, conceptual art project
like this would have received without it.
Streetsblog started in 2006 in concert with
the NYC Street Renaissance Campaign,
a larger scale advocacy effort, largely
credited with starting the public dialogue
around the use of public space and reallo-
cating the public right-of-way (ROW) for
non-motorized transportation (NMT) uses
(Streetsblog, 2006). The public discussions
in New York revolved around protected and
isolated bicycle lanes as the idea, reusing
and transforming space into public plazas,
and reducing space and therefore priority
allocated to automobiles. Streetsblog was
founded because the mainstream media
doesn't cover these issues. "Ask a person
in Brooklyn what they care about, and it's
about their neighborhood" (Naparstek,
2013). Local communities care deeply about
these issues, but there was no trusted me-
dia source that covered local transportation
and planning issues. A newsprint source or
magazine couldn't cover these issues. A blog
however, with just a couple people on staff,
could very efficiently and competently cover
these issues. This effort was also folded into
a larger campaign push for better transporta-
tion and public space policy during Bloom-
berg's re-election campaign, and then second
term to start in January 2006. Once the blog
existed, in a matter of weeks, it was clear
they had an audience. Now transportation
planning, even if it is a third tier issue, has a
power tool to getting it on the civic agenda
(Naparstek, 2013).
It was during this activist effort and stra-
tegic push that Rebar's PARK(ing) photo
appeared in Aaron Naparstek's email inbox.
In subsequent days, at least 15 different
people emailed him this photo. Like any
powerful political conceptual art project,
PARK(ing) went viral because it communi-
cated all these progress city design ideas and
ideals-public space, people-centric cities,
NMT, ROW reprioritizing-in one succinct
image (Naparstek, 2013). "I mark that the
beginning of the Livable Streets movement
3.0 as PARK(ing) Day 2005; where you
have this one art project, of some people
transforming the street, going out and doing
it on their own in a tactical urbanist fashion,
not demanding something of government,
not holding signs on the steps of city hall,
they just went out and transformed the street
on their own, with their own resources and
using the legitimate rules of that street, put-
ting quarters in the meter. So it was a really
powerful image and idea" (Naparstek, 2013).
PARK(ing) Day was another vote of confi-
dence for the issues that the Livable Streets
Movement advocated for, and also helped
Streetsblog gain content.
These types of cross-pollination efforts
between San Francisco and New York City
helped create a dynamic exchange of ideas
which eventually led to tangible changes in
policy in both cities.
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4. CONCLUSION
Startingfrom something like PARK(ing)
Day to kind of a city-sanctionedpilot,
to now a regular permit program [the
parklets]... in the course ofjust a couple
ofyears... you know, things don't often
happen that fast... [Tjhat says something
of the power of that kind of innovation
being able to become institutionalized in
a good way veiy quickly.
- Ed Reiskin, current Director of SFM-
TA, former Director ofPublic Works,
reflecting on tactical urbanism
What is the verdict on tactical urbanism
(TU)? Can it be used as an effective tool
for change? Or is it a liability or a trendy
blip on the radar? The short answer: Yes...
with caveats. If used strategically and with
awareness, tactical urbanism can be a power-
ful tool to highlight need in a given area.
With each unique TU intervention, nuances
vary within each variable-timing, political
agenda, leadership, institutional roles and
capacity-that when aggregated together
ultimately determine the fate of the project.
OVERVIEW
This thesis examined how and under what
conditions tactical urbanism has developed,
its range, and impact. Chapter 1 reviewed
developments in participatory planning,
civic leadership and city-making in relation
to tactical urbanism. It explored some of the
recent academic work around this new trend
since tactical urbanism was only defined in
2010.
Chapter 2 surveyed three tactical urbanist
interventions ("caselets") that highlighted
mobility and public space concerns in their
cities. The research explores how and under
what conditions each project developed.
Each case-Better Block, Dallas, Walk
Raleigh, North Carolina, and Guerrilla Bike
Lane Separators on Bergen Street, Brook-
lyn-was captured in a different stage of
recognition:
. Better Block, Dallas: Better Block
(BB) received enough attention to estab-
lished itself as a non-profit organization
that promotes the BB "method"-a tacti-
cal urbanist approach to implementing
Complete Street-type design strategies-
to residents and neighborhoods nation
wide. As of 2013, their project helped to
implement 28 other BBs (Open Source,
2012).
* Walk Raleigh, North Carolina: The
city government is piloting Walk Ra-
leigh's signage. However there is no
information if walking increased after
posting the signage. Nor is there infor-
mation on the impact of the Walk Your
City non-profit, or any of the "Walk
Your City" spinoffs it inspired.
. Guerrilla Bike Lane Separators on
Bergen Street, Brooklyn, New York:
After back-and-forth between the NYC
Department of Transportation, NY
Police Department, the District Precinct
Deputy Inspector, and residents, police
barricade dividers were placed along
the bicycle lane to resolve the problem.
Media touted a vast improvement in
bikability, (though there was no outside
source to support this claim). As of April
2013, the barriers are up, protecting the
bike lane (Makagon, 2013).
Chapter 3 explored the urban legend around
PARK(ing) Day and the San Francisco (SF)
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parklet program. PARK(ing)'s approach
differed in many regards from the other
interventions. Although it exploited legal
loopholes, it stayed within the legal bound-
aries. The intervention was hyper-temporary,
lasting only two hours (the limit on the me-
ter). Using this approach, PARK(ing) did not
steamroll public opinion. It merely asked,
"What if?"
Of all the interventions surveyed,
PARK(ing) was the least heavy-handed, least
invasive, and the most nuanced tactical inter-
vention. It was also the most successful. In
the end, parklets became part of San Fran-
cisco Planning's Pavement2Parks program
in 2010 ("Pavement to Parks," n.d.).
However, it would be naYve to conclude
that parklets are a direct manifestation of
PARK(ing) Day. The parklets came to frui-
tion from efforts on many different levels
across government, the private sector, the
non-profit sector, and civic activists and
leaders. Over the five-year time span-from
the first PARK(ing) installation in 2005 to
the first parklet at Mojo's in 2010-different
parties focused their efforts on a diversified
strategy. These activities overlapped and
synchronized with each other. Together these
efforts created a "climate of change" in the
city. Analysis shows us tactical urbanism
was one highly effective tool within a larger
arsenal.
SAN FRANCISCO PARKLETS
TODAY
Today the parklet program enjoys great
popularity. With thirty-eight parklets in
operation as of January 2013, and the city
receiving upwards of 200+ applications
per Request For Proposal (RFP) period, the
program is growing at a rapid rate (Chasan,
2013; P2P, 2013b). In 2013, P2P published
the first free San Francisco Parklet Manual
on their website to guide local interests and
provide a resource to assist others in estab-
lishing parklet programs in their respective
cities (P2P, 2013b).
However as the program grows in popu-
larity, applicants and users, new demands
and pressures are also applied to the public
sector. In short, the program is dealing with
"growing pains" (Chasan, 2013). Some
of the challenges include: maintenance,
management, and private sector responsi-
bility and involvement, such as feasibil-
ity of micro public-private-partnerships in
small-scale projects. One of the first parklet
sponsors recently applied to remove their
parklet because the effort outweighed the
gain (Chasan, 2013). Some parklet spon-
sors received citations for mismanagement
(Chasan, 2013). Since they are considered a
public space, vending or any type of exclu-
sionary tactic on the parklets remains illegal.
Other difficulties arise when a business
moves or goes out of business. Who takes
care of the parklet? Does it stay or go?
It also remains to be seen how the city
continues to work with the private sector.
There are considerable tensions between
the two, with small businesses continually
calculating their own cost-benefit analyses.
Small businesses buy the supplies; build,
sponsor, and maintain the parklet; and take
on the liability for the parklet-all without
an ownership stake. The parklet must remain
public property, and businesses cannot sell
goods, alcohol, or control it as their own.
With the growing popularity of the program,
there is little doubt that businesses see it as
a worthwhile investment. Still some busi-
nesses, and parklet sponsors, do question if
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it is worth the responsibility, liability, and
cost in the end.
This tension could pose a challenge for city
leaders that see parklets as an incremental
approach to building sidewalk extensions.
The ultimate goal being a continuous parklet
(sidewalk extension) that creates a wider
pedestrian zone by placing the "caf6" load
on the outside to free up the sidewalk for
improved circulation and walkability. If
businesses grow unhappy with the cur-
rent arrangement, using this micro public-
private-partnerships (PPPs) model may not
be feasible. The long-term viability of micro
PPPs remains to be seen.
Nonetheless, the trend is catching on and
parklets are popping up in other cities. Los
Angeles and Chicago already fashioned their
own parklets, with Chicago calling them
'people spots" (Glick Kudler, 2013; CBS
Chicago, 2012). They are also extending fur-
ther east as Boston issued a RFP for parklets
in 2012 (Moskowitz, 2012).
EXPLAINING THE FORMALIZA-
TION OF SAN FRANCISCO'S
PARKLET PROGRAM
1. Integrate public-private-partnership
into small-scale projects. Essentially the
private sector funds the parklet program. San
Francisco Planning needed the private sector
as a serious partner to get this program off
the ground. That said the program is fac-
ing growing pains-mainly how to make it
worthwhile for small businesses to afford
them and maintain the spirit of the program.
If this reliance on small business private sec-
tor funds is a developing trend in the public
sector, government might consider other
ways to incentivize more private sector in-
volvement into civic improvement projects.
As it stands, PPPs at this scale have potential
but need to be worked out.
2. Experiment with new process strate-
gies for project implementation. Riffing
off New York City's approach, San Fran-
cisco (SF) established their own "incre-
mental process" to implement projects. The
city cobbled together their own design and
implementation typology to get a quick,
sanctioned installation on the ground. Rather
than approaching the parklets as your typical
large capital investment project and using
the traditional public forum planning pro-
cess, San Francisco started the program by
installing one parklet. The city kept much
of the project out of the public dialogue,
and used previous surveys and established
middle-class community organizations-
such as merchants organizations, community
groups-to interact and get feedback from
residents and business owners closest to the
first parklet. Then using donated light-weight
and low-cost materials, the city installed the
first parklet with volunteers and little paid
labor. Businesses apply to sponsor parklets
through a RFP.
Although P2P did not use the most public
planning process to start with, this incre-
mental approach facilitates the establishment
of parklets where they are most wanted.
Pavement2Parks (P2P) effectively "salted"
the city with parklets, and then they flourish
and multiply where they "stick." They will
multiply-and perhaps connect into bona
fide sidewalk extenders-where they are
most wanted and used.
3. Establish mechanisms for frequent
peer-to-peer exchange and city-to-city
dialogue. Janette Sadik-Kanh's visit was
hugely influential in helping San Francisco
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leadership strategize ways to move forward
with their own public space and non-motor-
ized transportation improvements. Cities and
governments benefit from the sharing and
cross-pollination of ideas. Dialogue, face-to-
face exchange, and relationship building is a
crucial component of this effort.
4. Dedicate sufficient institutional capac-
ity for a project. SF Planning dedicated
institutional capacity for P2P. The project
needed a "champion" to coordinate with all
the various government organizations and
interest groups and push the project to a
tangible outcome.
5. Projects that can harness the political
momentum for their own objectives have
a better chance of implementation. A
larger conversation rethinking public space
and mobility in San Francisco was taking
place among city and civic leadership before
Rebar debuted PARK(ing) Day. Tapping
into the zeitgeist of the city, PARK(ing) Day
struck a nerve and became a powerful voice
in this conversation.
6. The entire strategy aligned with the
election cycle of elected officials. Large
capital projects typically do not come to
fruition under an elected official's term. This
creates a motivation barrier because their
re-election depends on projects and policies
established on their watch they can show-
case. Politicians are more likely to support
projects that are innovative, "cool," and de-
liverable within their term. The incremental,
somewhat top-down strategy for parklets fit
Mayor Newsom's timeline.
7. Political agendas were aligned. All key
decision-makers were on-board with
rethinking and reprioritizing the right-of-
way. The challenge was not political will,
but rather how to implement the changes
given the budget shortages.
8. The different parties involved in the
project worked symbiotically with each
other. Each sector-government, small
business, non-profit-had their own agenda,
but their work was complimentary. The
San Francisco Bicycle Coalition sometimes
spoke to concerns from the private sector
that SF Planning could not (Chasan, 2013).
Though small business had to financially
invest in the project, they did because the
public good and private gain of the parklet
outweighed the cost of investment (Nelson,
2013). Different government agencies had
different objectives, but the same goal.
9. Everyone claimed ownership, profes-
sional responsibility and took the lead
at different points in the process. The
parklets came to fruition from group effort.
While Andres Power (former Program Man-
ager, Pavement to Parks, SF Planning) was
the key coordinator and parklet champion,
the project had many other coordinators to
push the policies through in their respective
departments and organizations.
TAKEAWAYS ON TACTICAL
URBANISM
In the previous chapters, we learn that tacti-
cal urbanism is both a play on the physical
and political landscape, manifested as a de-
sign intervention. This section will highlight
four broadly defined takeaways for activists,
policy makers, and urban tacticians alike.
a. The TU Playbook: breaking down the
strategy of tacticians into a 3-step process.
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b. Exploring TU as a source of innovation
for cities.
c. Who are the tacticians? What does this
mean for cities?
d. Highlighting the risks and rewards of
tactical urbanism. Does TU need a Code of
Ethics?
Each intervention was not a means to an end.
In some successful cases the intervention
becomes a stepping-stone to create a longer-
term solution. However, the long-term
viability of tactical urbanism appears to de-
pend on the tactician's ability to engage the
interest of the public and the more powerful
interest groups in the area. The next chal-
lenge is navigating the institutional process
and using the different levers of power for
positive change.
THE TU PLAYBOOK: BREAKING
DOWN THE STRATEGY OF TACTI-
CIANS INTO A 3-STEP PROCESS.
In an effort to breakdown the tactician's
strategy, a broad brushed TU playbook
might read:
1. Do first.
2. Try to rally public interest through media
coverage to build political will.
3. Seek official support.
1. Do first.
The first step of the tactician is to intervene
physically with a design intervention (e.g.
guerilla bicycle lane, pop-up space, or oth-
er). "Doing first" provides a mechanism to
feasibly test out physical design ideas. There
is a certain genius to piloting. It offers an
opportunity to pilot physical interventions in
the real world before committing to a serious
capital investment. "It's one thing to crunch
numbers and come up with a traffic plan;
it's another to spend a week trying it in real
time, with real people" (Ross, 2012). As TU
interventions stand now, there is little oppor-
tunity for public input. In fact longevity of
the installation is the only potential signal of
community acceptance. Despite these limita-
tions, tactical urbanism provides a platform
to test ideas before investing considerable
resources in making them permanent.
This self-starter, entrepreneurial ethos is
closely tied with a results-driven approach
and instant gratification of our current time.
In an effort to innovate, these solo inventors
generally do not trouble themselves to gen-
erate public support first. Consensus build-
ing or public input is likely avoided because
it slows down the process, and/or stymies
innovation.
In the tactician's effort to "get things done
quickly" and "bypass bureaucracy," they
eventually come back to government in an
effort to formalize their intervention. Ironi-
cally these efforts lead to the starting place
they hoped to avoid (or expedite) in the first
place: the government. In the long run, tacti-
cians cannot "go it alone." They must learn
to work with the institutional and politi-
cal powers that be to implement long-term
stable change.
Tactical urbanism is not a panacea for the
dysfunction of government. It has the poten-
tial to be sorely misused without proper due
diligence before formalizing the interven-
tion. "Due diligence" means going through a
serious process that determines community
need, want, buy-in, and appropriate use of
design strategy-steps that help establish
legitimacy of a project.
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2. Try to rally public interest through me-
dia coverage to build political will.
Online documentation is a critical com-
ponent of the life of the project. Though
tactical urbanist interventions are physically
temporary, the life of each project can be
greatly extended by online documentation.
Social media can be used to promote the
project and "catch the eye" of formal media
sources too. PARK(ing) benefited from the
blogesphere, but really "went viral" because
it tapped into larger conversation over public
space and non-motorized transportation
already happening in San Francisco.
The implementer must devise a strategy that
also exploits the political zeitgeist of the city
by capitalizing on the "climate of change"
already brewing within the city (San Fran-
cisco), or calling attention to a lethargic or
mired city government (Dallas, Raleigh).
Savvy activists learn to listen to others
interests and stoke momentum by tying in
interests that they hear. They find a way to
fit their strategy to work with the momen-
tum, rather than go against the grain. Purists
on the other hand, are less flexible in their
strategy, which can make their efforts more
of an uphill battle.
Rallying public interest through media
coverage can generate enough momentum to
entice political will.
3. Seek official support
The next (and hardest) challenge is navigat-
ing the institutional process. The long-term
viability of tactical urbanism appears to de-
pend on the tactician's ability to engage the
interest of the public and the more powerful
interest groups in the area.
Strategies to obtain official support vary due
to context at multiple levels, including city
politics, community interests, intervention
approach, and more. Seeking official sup-
port differs from official permission. When
a TU intervention seeks support in pursuit of
formalization, they are also seeking funding.
With funding comes support, as compared to
permission, which does not imply funding.
This comparative matrix (see Figure X, page
X) helps to break down some of the key
characteristics and greater context within
each case study intervention. The context
surround each project is different. Here we
can see PARK(ing) was the most successful
project, with "success" defined by the for-
malization of an intervention. Interestingly,
it was also the most open-ended interven-
tion. PARK(ing) highlighted the change it
wanted to create, but did not prescribe a so-
lution to resolve the issue of a lack of public
space in San Francisco. Part of PARK(ing)'s
popularity and success may be attributed to
its novelty. With the first project launched in
2005, it was one of the very first recognized
TU interventions on the map.
Walk Raleigh and Better Block both high-
lighted a problem in an effort to change
policy in their respective cities. Each project
prescribed solutions to change their respec-
tive environments. They are prescriptive
interventions, with Walk Raleigh's specific
locational signage and choice of wording
giving the most specific prescribed solution
of the two.
Better Block's intervention worked with
business in the area, so there was more com-
munity involvement and the possibility for a
co-produced prescriptive intervention. Both
projects respective impact remain unclear.
While components of Walk Raleigh's project
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TACTICAL ACTION START LOCAL HIGHLIGHTING VS. RESULT DEGREE OF
URBANISM DATE CONTEXT PRESCRIBING FORMALIZATION
INTERVENTION
Characterizing TU Action
PARK(ING) Transformed me- 2005 Rebar developed Intervention highlight- Municiple Parklet Formal.
tered parking spot this intervention in ed a need. Program in SF Plan- Now SF has a formalized
San Francisco, into a termporary response to a master ning's Pavement- parklet program.
California "park" plan that did not in- PARK(ing) was an 2Parks.
crease public space open demo that pub-
in the city. licly asked SF to think Rebar's PARK(ing)
"What if?" Day is now cel-
ebrated worldwide.
WALK Posted guerrilla 2012 Raleigh has a pe- Intervention both high- The city is piloting Semi-formal. The city is
RALEIGH wayfinding signage destrian plan, but it lighted and prescribed the signage. piloting signage but no
lagged in terms of a solution. information is available if
North Carolina implementation. Walk Raleigh is now it increased walking in the
It garnered for change a non-profit. area.
by attempting to fix a
problem.
BETTER BLOCK Complete Street 2010 Developed out of Intervention both high- Better Block is a Recognized but not
block event frustration with auto- lighted and prescribed now a non-profit. formal. While the city
Dallas, Texas centric development a solution. recognizes the existince
in Dallas. of the program, they have
It garnered for change not adopted the policies.
by attempting to fix a
problem.
GUERRILLA Temporary physical 2012 Neighborhood Intervention prescribed City intervened and Semi-formal. Despite the
BIKE LANE barriers to protect resident was tired of a solution. put up police barri- use of temporary materi-
SEPARATORS existing bicycle lane NYPD parking in the cades as a tempo- als, the barricades are still
bicycle lane It literally provided a so- rary barrier- it is present one year later.
Brooklyn, lution for the problem. still up today.
New York I I I I I
Figure 14: Matrix comparing all four case studies
were incorporated into Raleigh's pedestrian
plan, whether it motivates people to walk
more remains unclear. BB's seen its method
implemented in 28 cities across the nation
and is also now a non-profit, but the overall
impact of these events which promote rede-
signed blocks also remains unclear.
The Guerrilla Bike Lane Separators project
is the most prescriptive intervention. There
was little room for an open-ended conversa-
tion. Cones, and then barriers, were placed
to prevent NYPD from parking in the bike
lane. In the end it was a fairly simple, fo-
cused governance problem between NYPD
and the cyclists. The barriers still stand
almost a year later- as of April 2013 (Mak-
agon, 2013).
EXPLORING TU AS A SOURCE OF
INNOVATION FOR CITIES.
There is an entrepreneurial spirit that runs
through many tactical urbanist interven-
tions. TU can serve as a creative way for
government to publicly source innovation
while minimizing risk. TU works symbioti-
cally with the public sector because it takes
the risk out of the government's hands. The
public sector is subject to many different
pressures than the private sector; and gov-
ernment is notoriously risk-adverse while
many in the private sector approach risk as
a necessary step to innovate. Government
programs-such as the District of Colum-
bia's Temporary Urbanism Initiative, and the
pubic RFP system for SF's parklets (District
of Columbia Office of Planning, n.d.; P2P,
2013a)-hint at the possibilities for govern-
ment to tap into this innovative resource. In
TU, the risk lays solely on the individual and
if it is a "success"-meaning people like it
and the intervention stays put-that creates
a much lower barrier to entry for the public
sector.
With the potential for quick results and a
small price tag, TU is sexy. Since these
"light" projects yield quick, tangible re-
sults, TU also aligns with the election cycle
of politicians. Given the fast results, low
cost, and short timeline, it becomes easier
for government to invest in these types of
low-cost innovation generation programs.
However this points to a larger problem of
lack of capital investment by government.
Large capital projects are resource heavy and
do not align with our current election cycle.
TU is not a panacea for development woes,
and government must continue to invest in
capital-intensive innovation programs too.
Bypassing the system by using subversive
measures like TU is emerging as another
way to get things implemented. For these
reasons, TU also shares traits of disruptive
innovation. It is not replacing the formalized
public process, nor forcing it into obsoles-
cence, but if the trend continues to grow, it
has the power to change the dynamics of the
process.
WHO ARE THE TACTICIANS? WHAT
DOES THIS MEAN FOR CITIES?
Interestingly, tacticians from these projects
were all young (25-35 years), college-
educated white men that implemented
these projects alone, with little to no public
input process taken prior to the activity. It
is unclear why TU attracts such activists,
or why these activists in particular produce
successful activities that attract attention. If
TU becomes a new norm to implement strat-
egy, we should be conscious to the extent it
articulates, and can amplify, the vision of a
race, class, and gender already dominantly
52
represented in American society. TU might
become another advantage in an already
unequal system.
By doing first-and seeking permission or
approval later-these tacticians risk cross-
ing over into urban vigilantism territory:
taking the law into their own hands, with-
out recourse to lawful procedures. Tactical
urbanism brings self-selected local problems
to the forefront of public dialogue by imple-
menting a project that highlights a chosen
issue. Much of the energy of TU, and this
"self-help" activism, comes from the frustra-
tion with our planning process in the United
States.
If the project does not create public health
or safety issues (intentional or not), then TU
likely poses less risk for the tactician. In this
case, there is reduced risk for the tactician,
and the possibility of reward. Gauging risk
is complicated because it depends on the
government and their level of discretion
issue-to-issue. TU may burden government
capacity if the public sector faces an uptick
in TU interventions and continuously needs
to weigh whether to intervene or not.
The intent of each tactician appeared in
goodwill. They developed projects to
highlight an issue in their community, with
the possibility of personal, entrepreneurial
success as an added bonus. However all of
the activists broke the law (working without
a permit), and justified doing so, in the name
of civic improvement. But in the pursuit of
quick progress, this becomes a dangerous
strategy to normalize.
At this point, the larger worry is over the
lack of thought and principle behind the
action, not the actions itself. Without some
mechanism that protects the public, some
TU interventions may result in the uninten-
tional infringement of personal liberties.
Elected government, as imperfect and often
unrepresentative as it is in practice, is still
our principal device for aggregating prefer-
ences and reflecting 'public will.' Our laws
work to preserve order, enforce our social
contract, and however messy and flawed,
work to holds up our democratic values as
determined by a public process. To succeed
in the long run, tactical urbanism will need
to integrate some public input mechanism to
build legitimacy.
HIGHLIGHTING THE RISKS AND
REWARDS OF TACTICAL URBAN-
ISM. DOES TU NEED A CODE OF
ETHICS?
Though it is still very much a subcultural
movement, tactical urbanism is an emerging
trend and we have yet to see how it unfolds
elsewhere. Overall tactical urbanism appears
most effective when coupled with other tools
for change-participatory planning, commu-
nity organizing, non-profit activism, city-to-
city learning, city leadership onboard, and
media dissemination of knowledge.
The following matrix (see Figure X) breaks
down some of the risks and rewards of tacti-
cal urbanism,to illustrate a more complete
framework and understanding of TU.
To minimize these negative impacts, tactical
urbanism needs a code of ethics. Tacticians
could vow to create interventions that seek
to improve all social groups in the public
sphere; not, as it is now, to do whatever they
think is best. The Code of Ethics should
take into consideration the risks and rewards
outline above. The idea is not to trample or
restrict the free and innovative spirit of TU,
but to preserve the rewards and minimize the
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TACTICAL URBANISM AS A TOOL FOR CHANGE
REWARDS
Creatively highlight problems-and test
solutions-to gain the attention of city and
civic leadership.
Opportunity to test the genius of piloting
Government can use TU to publicly source
innovation.
Tactical urbanism shares elements of coun-
try's tradition of civil disobedience to call
attention to a critical need in the city.
R(S
One person's idea, from one dominant so-
cial group, not an idea built on community
consensus.
Dangers in testing first and asking ques-
tions later.
Unequal voice in public policy.
Despite this high-minded call to action,
there is a certain "deviant quality" to these
tactical activities.
Figure 15: Matrix comparing rewards and risks of tactical urbanism
risks. It would serve as a safe guard for tacti-
cians and the public alike.
NEXT STEPS FOR FUTURE
RESEARCH
As tactical urbanism is a nascent and diverse
field, there is much opportunity to investi-
gate other streams and influences of TU.
TU Code of Ethics. This Code of Ethics
should be developed by active tacticians to
truly reflect their set of concerns and risks.
It would serve as a safe guard for tacticians
and others alike, to preserve the rewards and
minimize the risks of TU.
Peer-to-peer, city-to-city dialogue. Janette
Sadik-Kanh's visit to San Francisco clearly
influenced city leaders and decision-making.
Investigating the power of peer-to-peer dia-
logues and how they influence change would
be a helpful for future programs.
Tactical urbanism and NYC's Public
Plazas Program. There also appears to be
much cross-pollination between San Fran-
cisco and New York City. Although San
Francisco created the first parklet, New York
City became famous for its public plazas.
It is unknown if the Public Plazas Program
came out as a response to tactical interven-
tions. There is little written information and
no urban legend like SF's PARK(ing) as-
sociating tactical urbanism and Public Plazas
Program. Further research about how New
York City developed their Public Plazas
Program and process of incrementalism may
help improve the understanding of tactical
urbanism and innovation spotting by govern-
ment.
Kickstarter campaigns in TU projects:
A better understanding of the influence of
outside monies on local projects and tactical
urbanism projects is needed. Research ex-
ploring the outside funding streams and the
influence on local community projects is an
important factor to consider that lends itself
to future research.
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FINAL COMMENTARY
Tactical urbanism is a play on the physi-
cal and political landscape, manifested as
a design intervention. Tacticians that relate
their projects to interest groups and govern-
ment have a better chance to formalize their
intervention. Interventions capture these
efforts with varying levels of success and
sophistication, with each project varying in
context and texture.
Tactical urbanism is not "good" or "bad,"
but requires a conscientious understand-
ing of the power and limitations of such a
strategy. It blurs the lines of participatory
planning and civic engagement. It is highly
individualistic, but also allows some space
for public participation. It has elements of
communitarianism but is not necessarily
democratic. It engages some civil disobe-
dience tactics, but does not encourage or
engage participatory techniques to articulate
a message or cause. It has the spirit of "self-
help" practices, but risks becoming an elitist
movement by representing the very few.
When government allows TU, it enables
selective crowdsourcing-an individual puts
forth an innovation, but the crowd reacts to
it. By removing the risk factor from govern-
ment, tactical urbanism works synergisti-
cally with the public sector to innovate by
pilot testing.
Tactical urbanism is not defined by expand-
ed participation in official decision-making
or deliberative practice but rather by small-
scale direct action-shaping outcomes im-
mediately, tangibly, on the ground.
In the case studies developed, we learn TU
is not means to an end. It is not the tool,
but one tool within a larger toolkit-par-
ticipatory planning, community organizing,
non-profit activism, city-to-city learning and
peer-to-peer exchange, and the media's dis-
semination of knowledge.
Furthermore, interventions that highlight a
need have more lasting power than interven-
tions that prescribe specific solutions. It is
likely due to increased flexibility and buy-in
by adopters if they can make it "their own."
The multifaceted variables of the zeitgeist
in the city also deeply influence the project
trajectory. City context, political agendas,
leadership are all critical issues that the
implementers ultimately have to contend
with if they want their projects to succeed.
However, the real test comes once the
project is implemented. In the end it the
long-term success and change-power of
tactical urbanism depends on the tacticians's
abilty to engage the public, navigate multi-
stakeholder, institutionalized processes of
democratic deliberation, decision-making,
and implementation.
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